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ABSTRACT
Congressional gridlock does more than frustrate the populace; it has far-
reaching effects, particularly for human rights abuses.  From Ferguson, 
Missouri to Flint, Michigan, government abuses of power and civil rights 
violations increasingly concern those within the United States.  Existing 
executive bodies, although able to investigate, lack the political power to 
force Congress to act to remedy these abuses and  neither Congress nor state
legislatures have offered any solutions. In response, activists have begun
to approach international bodies such as the United Nations to voice their 
concerns, which has also allowed them to re-characterize their plights as 
human rights issues.  If the United States government were able to follow 
suit, and re-characterize its systemic civil rights abuses as human rights
problems, the nation would open itself up to an international conversation
with a broader range of potential solutions. 
The United Kingdom’s Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) presents 
such a workable solution to congressional gridlock on human rights issues. 
The JCHR is a respected parliamentary committee that successfully influences 
all three British government branches to ensure that British legislation
protects human rights.  This Article shows, through empirical data and
anecdotal evidence, that the JCHR’s techniques and its corresponding
successes and failures can offer a prototype for a Congressional human rights
committee that would provide momentum for Congress, courts, the executive, 
and the public to ensure that Congress can prevent or quickly correct American
human rights abuses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years in the United States, several public scandals
have called into question the government’s ability to protect its citizens
22
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from human rights abuses.1  From police brutality in Ferguson to Flint’s
water crisis, Americans have become increasingly disillusioned and even 
hostile towards local, state, and federal governments in the face of these 
abuses. As a result, protests such as the Rebuild Flint March and Rally 
have abounded and social media assisted grassroots efforts like Black Lives 
Matter have surged.2 
Moreover, these groups and activists have begun to seek the help of
international authorities for these systemic, often racially-motivated problems.
For example, although activists and members of Michael Brown’s family 
spoke to various legislative and executive bodies at both the state and national 
level about police misconduct,3 they also raised these issues internationally
with the United Nations Committee Against Torture.4 Likewise, as federal 
and state agencies and government bodies attempted to deal with the aftermath
of the poisoned water crisis in Flint, Michigan, activists took their complaints
to United Nations Commission for Social Development.5 
Indeed, international human rights organizations have reported on the
United States’ recent public crises and have criticized the United States for its
“human rights abuses.”6  Several United Nations committees and commissions
 1. WORLD REPORT 2015: UNITED STATES EVENTS OF 2014, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Jan. 2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/unitedstates_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YW5V-TAQL].
2. Jacob Carah, Flint Activists Say ‘No Pipes, No Peace’ Amid Crisis, DETROIT 
NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint­
water-crisis/2016/02/19/flint-water-rally/80621258/ [https://perma.cc/6Z7A-F73U]; Dan
Frosch & Scott Calvert, A Year After Ferguson, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Still Wields Influence, 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 9, 2015, 2:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-year-after­
ferguson-black-lives-matter-still-wields-influence-1439143426 [https://perma.cc/3CU2-ANCU]. 
3. Justin Hansford & Meena Jagannath, Ferguson to Geneva: Using the Human Rights
Framework to Push Forward a Vision for Racial Justice in the United States After Ferguson, 
12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 121, 149–51 (2015). 
4. Id. at 123. 
5. Joel Kurth, United Nations to Hear About Detroit, Flint Water Woes, DETROIT
NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016, 12:30 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint­
water-crisis/2016/01/26/un-water/79349514/. 
6. See Terrence McCoy, Amnesty International: Ferguson Police Committed Human 
Rights Abuses During Michael Brown Protests, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2014, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/24/ferguson-police­
committed-numerous-human-rights-abuses-amnesty-international-says [https://perma.cc/XXL5- 
VFXF]; see also Amanda Klasing, Dispatches: Why Flint’s Tainted Water is a Human Rights
Disaster, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 25, 2016, 1:06 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/
01/25/dispatches-why-flints-tainted-water-human-rights-disaster [https://perma.cc/P79Q­
D4T7]; US: Respect Rights of Ferguson Protesters, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2014,
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also sought information from the United States government about these 
dilemmas, which the United States must provide under its various United
Nations treaty obligations.7  The United Nations also recommended that 
the United States implement long-term systemic changes, such as improving 
its monitoring of police brutality, as well as more immediate, short-term 
changes, such as ceasing the water shutoffs in Flint.8  The United States 
has also recently re-committed itself to championing human rights internationally
and domestically.9 
By involving the United Nations, activists have not only raised the
profile of these crises and invoked the power of international human rights
bodies, but they have also reframed their struggles under a human rights 
framework, which can be exceedingly powerful.10 Additionally, these 
newly-framed human rights have highlighted the United States’ current 
inability to address national human rights issues in a structured, cohesive 
way.  In fact, although Americans do not usually discuss “human rights,” 
much of the United States’ international human rights obligations mirror 
domestic law requirements under the Bill of Rights or existing civil rights
laws.11  Human rights are not new to the United States; Americans simply 
call them “civil rights,” “constitutional rights,” or just “rights.”12  This Article,
therefore, includes domestic as well as international human rights obligations 
when it discusses human rights as a category of rights.
Despite its longstanding domestic and international human rights obligations,
the United States has no national government body charged with 
investigating, reporting, or recommending solutions to the United States’ 
human rights abuses at the national, state, and local level.  Specifically, 
although several state and federal government bodies focus on human rights
issues on some level, the United States lacks a standing or special legislative
committee charged with the protection of its residents’ human rights.  The 
6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/19/us-respect-rights-ferguson-protesters
[https://perma.cc/9FY3-HZSP].
7.  Hansford & Jagannath, supra note 3, at 141. 
8. Kurth, supra note 5.
 9. Human Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.state.gov/p/io/ 
humanrights/ [https://perma.cc/4YKH-JWW4]. However, Trump’s administration is unlikely
to have such a good relationship with the UN.  Adam Shaw, UN tensions with Trump administration
mount as both sides dig in, FOX NEWS (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/04/ 
10/un-tensions-with-trump-administration-mount-as-both-sides-dig-in.html. 
10.  Hansford & Jagannath, supra note 3, at 123. 
11. The United States’ International Human Rights Obligations, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE
CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/U.S.-Human-Rights-Obligations2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/736C-EUCM] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
12. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DIST. OF MINN., KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: A
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
usao-mn/legacy/2011/09/16/MN%20Civil%20Rights%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8SV8-YJE7] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
24
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closest entities that the United States has created are the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights (hereinafter the “Commission on Civil Rights”) 
and the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (hereinafter the 
“Civil Rights Division”). The Commission on Civil Rights advises Congress 
and the President on policy to eliminate racial discrimination13 and the
Civil Rights Division enforces existing civil rights laws.14  Both entities have
experienced mixed success in recent years, however, and even at their 
most successful, never examined the full range of human rights issues that 
the United States guarantees under the Constitution or must consider under
United Nations treaties.15 
In contrast, the United Kingdom’s JCHR is a parliamentary committee 
that works to ensure that the United Kingdom meets all its human rights 
obligations with various international bodies such as the United Nations
and the Council of Europe.16 The JCHR has also adopted several techniques
that quickly made it an influential voice on human rights within the British
government.  The JCHR therefore presents a useful model for an American 
human rights committee.
Moreover, although scholars have written extensively on Ferguson,
Flint, and other recent public crises, this Article presents the first effort to 
provide a model for a human rights committee in the United States that
could fully investigate and create laws to address human rights concerns.
Part II of this Article will evaluate the two main government bodies that 
have been charged with protecting civil rights in the United States: the 
Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil Rights Division.  Part III will 
discuss the history of the JCHR and use recently-gathered empirical evidence
to show how it has successfully influenced all three government branches 
in the United Kingdom.  Finally, Part IV will show some of the positive things
a human rights committee could do in the United States by using the JCHR’s
activities and successes as a model, including encouraging Congress to
create legislation and informing the judiciary regarding human rights issues. 
13. Although originally intended to be temporary, the Commission has been repeatedly
reauthorized, most recently by the Civil Rights Commission Amendments Act of 1994.  
Kenneth L. Marcus, The Right Frontier for Civil Rights Reform, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 77, 77–78 (2008). 
14. Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
211, 212 (2008). 
15. See, e.g., id.; Marcus, supra note 13, at 82. 
16. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-THIRD REPORT: THE COMMITTEE’S 
FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, 2005-6, HL 239, HC 1575, at 3–4 (UK) [hereinafter THE
COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES].
 25





    
 



















   
  
 
   
      
  
 
   
    
     
   
    




Since the 1950s, the United States has attempted to improve the civil
rights of its citizens, particularly African-Americans.  Beginning with the 
1957 Civil Rights Act, Congress created various federal government entities
to implement civil rights improvements across the country.17  However, 
several causes – most recently, politics – have splintered these efforts and
created a gap in the protection of civil and human rights.  Moreover, although 
the Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil Rights Division of the 
Department of Justice have both accomplished much and continue to advance
civil rights, both entities suffer from limitations and weaknesses due to 
their internal structures and scope of responsibilities.18 
Congress created the Commission on Civil Rights with the 1957 Civil
Rights Act and assigned it investigatory and advisory functions, including 
subpoena powers.19  It envisioned the Commission as a bipartisan, independent
executive agency that would collect data to enable Congress to create civil 
rights policy.20  Initially, the Commission on Civil Rights investigated 
“race-based deprivations of voting rights and of the right to equal protection 
of the laws.”21 Criticized by both liberals and conservatives at first, the
Commission on Civil Rights gathered evidence and held hearings, which 
ultimately led to documented evidence of racial disparity in voting rights, 
education, public accommodation, and housing.22  This evidence-gathering 
resulted in legislative recommendations that led to praise from the media,
and ultimately informed several pieces of civil rights legislation, including 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.23 
During the 1970s, the Commission on Civil Rights continued to hold
hearings and publish recommendations, but President Nixon’s administration
17.  Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (Sept. 9, 1957). 
18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-58, DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 
TRAVEL: DIVISION STRENGTHENED CONTROLS OVER TRAVEL, BUT ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT IDENTIFIED (2015); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-/HEHS-97– 
125, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: AGENCY LACKS BASIC MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
(1997).
19. Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal Government, 
88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 733–34 (2010). 
20. Marcus, supra note 13, at 89. 
21.  Jennifer Mason McAward, The Civil Rights Legacy of Fr. Theodore M. Hesburgh, 
C.S.C., 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 309, 311 (2014). 
22. Jocelyn C. Frye et al., The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 463 (1987); McAward, supra note 21, at 311. 
23.  Frye et al., supra note 22, at 465; McAward, supra note 21, at 311–12. 
26
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frequently disregarded its recommendations.24  President Reagan then began 
to staff the Commission on Civil Rights with conservatives;25 by 2005, a
majority of the Commission on Civil Rights and its Staff Director identified 
as conservative.26  This new political makeup resulted in criticisms that 
the Commission maintained an overly optimistic view of racial relations27 
and an overly negative view of affirmative action.28 The political makeup 
also limited its activities by creating several deadlocks.29  Under President
Obama, however, the Commission on Civil Rights regained some of its 
influence. For example, the Commission on Civil Rights published a negative 
report on the Akaka bill, a bill supported by Barack Obama that proposed
to redistribute the state’s wealth based on race.30  Congress used the
Commission on Civil Rights’ report during floor debates in Congress and
the contested bill was ultimately defeated.31  It is unclear what role the 
Commission on Civil Rights will play under Trump’s administration.32 
The second relevant civil rights government body is the Civil Rights 
Division. Like the Commission on Civil Rights, Congress created the 
Civil Rights Division through the Civil Rights Act of 1957.33  As part of the
executive branch, the Civil Rights Division enforces civil rights laws, which 
includes investigating,34 filing charges,35 bringing lawsuits,36 entering into 
24. See Frye et al., supra note 22, at 467–68. 
25. Id. at 476–77. 
26. Marcus, supra note 13, at 77–78, 92. 
27.  Frye et al., supra note 22, at 503–04. 
28. Marcus, supra note 13, at 80–82.  In fact, the Commission’s budget was reduced 
in 2008 because the (Democrat-controlled) Appropriations Committee doubted its commitment 
to fulfilling its mission.  Id. at 80. 
29. Id. at 95. 
30. See Aloha, Segregation: The Akaka Bill Would Create a Race-Based State in Hawaii, 
WALL STREET J.: REV. & OUTLOOK (Dec. 17, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052970203917304574412832314714444. 
31. Marcus, supra note 13, at 112–13, 117. 
32. Laura Santhanam, U.S. ‘Has Not Yet Reached the Mountaintop,’ Says New Civil 
Rights Commission Chair, PBS (Feb. 21, 2017, 4:11 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
rundown/u-s-not-yet-reached-mountaintop-says-new-civil-rights-commission-chair/ [https://
perma.cc/KJ22-N288].
33. John Doar, The Work of the Civil Rights Division in Enforcing Voting Rights 
Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997). 
34. Gerald Stern et al., Voices of the Civil Rights Division: Then and Now (October 
28, 2011), 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 269, 272 (2013). 
35. James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 991, 993 (1999). 
36. Doar, supra note 33, at 7.
 27




















        




         
      
 
  






    
       
  
consent decrees,37 filing amicus curiae briefs,38 publishing papers recommending
institutional reforms,39 and generally serving “as the federal government’s
public and internal voice on civil rights, representing the United States in 
the nation’s courts and serving as an authority and resource for other
government agencies on issues relating to discrimination.”40  For example, 
in 2014, the Civil Rights Division released reports detailing its investigations
of police abuses in Cleveland and Ferguson.41  Additionally, the Civil Rights
Division “has been a major participant in congressional consideration of
civil rights legislation, and it has worked closely with Congress in drafting 
nearly all of the legislation it enforces.”42 
However, as with the Commission on Civil Rights, the second Bush
Administration undermined the Civil Rights Division when it politicized
the office, which led to a breakdown in communications between political 
appointees and career civil servants.43  Political appointees controlled hiring 
decisions with changed hiring practices that allowed them to ensure that
all new hires shared their political affiliations and ideology.44  Under Donald 
Trump, the future of the Civil Rights Division has become even more uncertain.45 
Even without politicization, the Commission on Civil Rights and the 
Civil Rights Division are limited in their abilities. Congress created both 
the Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil Rights Division to promote 
civil rights, not human rights, which is an issue of more than just semantics. 
The concept of “civil rights” is deeply embedded in American history and 
inextricably intertwined with the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s.46 
This concept therefore concerns itself with righting injustices, particularly 
 37. Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2009). 
38. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 234. 
39. Harmon, supra note 37, at 56. 
40. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 212. 
41. N. DIST. OF OHIO, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE & CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE (Dec. 4, 2014), http:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_
division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBQ6-YSRK]; CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR7D-4HCA]. 
42. Kennedy, supra note 14, at 235. 
43. Id. at 212. 
44. Id. at 215–16. 
45. Matt Apuzzo, Under Trump, Approach to Civil Rights Law Is Likely To Change 
Definitively, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/
civil-rights-justice-department-donald-trump.html. 
46. Christopher W. Schmidt, The Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Divide, 12 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 1, 21–24 (2016); see also Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective
Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1752 (2000). 
28
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racial injustices, so that all groups receive the same rights under the Constitution
and other laws.47  According to one commentator, 
Civil rights flow from the values of those in power; human rights originate in the
universal values of the peoples of the world. Civil rights are derived from a national
statute or a constitution over which the oppressors might have full control; human
rights are rooted in the inherent dignity of all members of the human family. Civil 
rights are administered within the jurisdiction of a nation-state; human rights are 
monitored in global forums.48 
Therefore, by focusing on “civil rights,” the United States has failed to 
take on other kinds of rights championed by other countries and international
human rights bodies such as economic, cultural and social rights.49  Civil 
rights activists including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X first 
observed these lacunae in the 1960s.50  For them, civil rights were “best
understood as a sub-category within the broader category of human rights,
which included not only civil rights and civil liberties, but also, most 
importantly, social welfare rights.”51 
In addition, the concept of civil rights in the United States became chiefly 
defined as a fight against racial discrimination and, as racial relations have 
changed over time, many people believe either that racial discrimination 
no longer presents a problem in the United States or that policies like 
affirmative action constitute “reverse racism” because they disadvantage 
white people.52  Accordingly, civil rights, of which this author does not dispute
the importance, may regain more general support if brought under the wider 
umbrella of human rights. 
Indeed, American “civil rights scholars, lawyers, and activists are increasingly 
looking toward international human rights instruments as persuasive sources
47.  Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 46, at 1752–54. 
48. Ali Khan, Lessons from Malcolm X: Freedom by Any Means Necessary, 38 
HOW. L.J. 79, 128 (1994) (footnotes omitted). 
49.  Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 46, at 1782–83. 
50. Raymond M. Brown, The Civil Rights Movement’s Early Embrace of Human
Rights, 286 N.J. LAW. 54, 59 (2014); Khan, supra note 48, at 124–25; Schmidt, supra note 
46, at 33. 
51. Schmidt, supra note 46, at 33. 
52. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Poll: Public Opposes Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (July 8, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/08/poll-finds-public­
opposition-considering-race-and-ethnicity-college-admissions [https://perma.cc/6MCM­
NZUU]; Janell Ross, White Americans Long For the 1950s, When They Didn’t Face So Much


























   
    
  
 
   
   
   
  
 
      
   
   
 
 
   
for legal strategies to address a broad range of advocacy issues presented 
by social and economic discrimination.”53  Prominent members of the
Commission on Civil Rights have previously suggested expanding the
Commission’s remit to include human rights, which, they argued, would 
restore the Commission’s reputation, bolster the United States’ leadership
in human rights issues, and allow the Commission to ensure that the United 
States meets its international human rights obligations.54  Accordingly, there
is increasing interest in creating a government body that can focus on human
rights and not just civil rights. 
To that end, a standing or special congressional committee could either
supplement or replace the work that the Commission on Civil Rights and
Civil Rights Division does for the executive branch.  A congressional committee
would be a valuable tool to promote human rights because Congress would 
support the committee and the committee could perform the same duties 
as the current Commission on Civil Rights.  A human rights-focused entity
in Congress would also arguably have more weight in both chambers because 
it would be perceived as an internal, rather than external, agency. 
In addition, Congress confers wide-ranging powers to its committees 
that would benefit a human rights body.55  Specifically, in addition to writing 
reports and scrutinizing bills, congressional committees can investigate 
and hold hearings.56  Congressional committees also hold broad subpoena
powers.  Standing committees in both houses can investigate anything within 
their jurisdiction and s automatically have subpoena power.57  Select and
special committees may receive subpoena power through a resolution from
whichever house of Congress created them.58 
These committees also have wide discretion to obtain whatever evidence 
they deem necessary so long as a legislative purpose for the investigation 
exists. Legislative purposes include gathering information to determine 
53. Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 46, at 1779–80; see also Kenneth L. Marcus, 
Fixing the Civil Rights Commission, 11 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 9, 
10 (2010) (noting recent human rights remarks by President Obama and Secretary Hillary
Clinton).
54. See Lisa Crooms & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Future of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 127, 129–30 (2010); Marcus, supra note 53, 
at 10.  Indeed, several international human rights conventions directly address various forms of
discrimination such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 46, at 1779–80. 
55. See James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1121 (2007). 
56. Id. at 1121–24. 
57. See id. at 1124–26. 
58. Id. at 1125.  Only committees can issue subpoenas; Congress itself cannot. Id. 
at 1126–27. 
30
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whether to legislate in a given area, conducting oversight over the executive,
and providing information about the workings of government.59  Further, 
committee hearings have multiple purposes including informing Congress’s
legislative decisions and presenting issues for public discourse.60 A 
committee could use all of these powers to advance human rights issues
within Congress and, therefore, a congressional human rights committee 
could ensure that legislation sufficiently protects human rights.  As shown
below, the JCHR provides substantial evidence that a human rights committee 
can effectively advocate for human rights within the government.
III. THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 

A MODEL OF SUCCESS
 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom is bound by several 
international human rights treaties.  In addition to adopting various United
Nations instruments, the United Kingdom ratified the European Convention
on Human Rights (hereinafter, the “European Convention”) in 1951, and, 
in 1966, allowed its citizens to bring a private right of action before the 
European Court of Human Rights.61  In 2000, the United Kingdom implemented
the Human Rights Act (HRA), which gave British citizens the right to sue 
the British government in British courts for alleged infringement of the 
rights contained in the European Convention.62 
The JCHR was first formally proposed in connection with the HRA.  In 
its initial draft, the HRA included a provision that stated that the JCHR 
should assist Parliament in playing a larger role with respect to human
rights.63  When Parliament debated the HRA, several commentators and 
the Home Office stated that Parliament should take the leading role in
protecting human rights64 and repeatedly cited the future JCHR as a way 
59. Id. at 1122. 
60. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme 
Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 328, 384, 387 (2001). 
61. Human Rights: The European Convention, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2000, 3:19 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/948143.stm [https://perma.cc/BX5N-5WP2]. 
62. Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help 
Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT’L J. CON. LAW 1, 2 (2006).
63. Id. at 14. 
64. HOME DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997,
Cm. 3782, ¶ 3.6 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/263526/rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KC8-MQ83]; Keith D. Ewing, The Human
Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 97 (1999); Janet L. 
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for Parliament to have a strong role in human rights protection, primarily
through scrutinizing proposed legislation.65 Accordingly, legislative scrutiny 
was one of the JCHR’s duties, though no one formally settled the exact form 
that scrutiny would take.66  Further, parliamentary debates clearly demonstrated 
that Parliament intended that the JCHR would go beyond mere legislative 
scrutiny to educate the public and promote a human rights culture.67 
Once Parliament passed the HRA, proposals for the duties of the JCHR 
became closely aligned with its eventual terms of reference.68  The JCHR’s
terms of reference are (1) “to consider matters relating to human rights in
the United Kingdom (but excluding consideration of individual cases),”69 
(2) consider “proposals for remedial orders made under Section 10,” and 
(3) decide whether to draw Parliament’s attention to draft remedial orders 
and remedial orders.70  This remit gives the JCHR the power to do almost 
anything relating to human rights in the United Kingdom.71  According to the 
JCHR’s first chair, Baroness Jean Corston, Parliament gave her a “blank piece
of paper” and allowed her to decide what the focus of the JCHR would be.72 
Hiebert, Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of Legislative Rights Review, 35
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 235, 251 (2005); Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act, supra
note 62, at 14; Jack Straw & Paul Boateng, Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to
Incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 71, 79 (1997). 
65. 582 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1997) col. 1240, 1300 (UK) (Lord Lester); 585 Parl
Deb HL (5th ser.) (1998) col. 406–07 (UK) (Lord Irvine); HOUSE OF LORDS, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS BILL [HL], BILL 119 OF 1997-98: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS,
RESEARCH PAPER 98/27, at 5, 34 (Feb. 13, 1998). 
66. 306 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1998) col. 855 (UK) (Mike O’Brien, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office); Straw & Boateng, supra note 64, at 79. 
67. 582 Parl Deb HL, supra note 65, at col. 1228, 1234 (Lord Irvine), 1290 (Lord 
Bethell), 1309 (Lord Williams). 
68. 322 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1998) col. 604 (UK).  Despite this clearer vision, 
the JCHR was not created until January 2001 after lobbying by NGOs and the Human 
Rights Task Force.  Francesca Klug, Professorial Research Fellow, Ctr. for the Study of Human
Rights, Address at the London School of Economics: Parliament and Human Rights in the 
UK: Two Years On (Nov. 2002), http://www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/events/Parliament_
Human_Rights.aspx; 621 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2001) col. 11–12 (UK) (Lord MacKay). 
69. This restriction means that the JCHR cannot provide advice regarding cases that 
are currently pending or have been litigated in court. 
70. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIRST SPECIAL REPORT: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AND POLICE BILL, 2000-1, HL 42, HC 296 (UK). 
71. During the debate in the Commons on the JCHR’s terms of reference, then Deputy
Leader of the House, Paddy Tipping MP, remarked that the JHCR’s powers were wide, 
and, in respect of the Committee’s consideration of remedial orders, were wide enough to 
allow the Committee to do “virtually what it wants.”  361 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (2001) col. 
150 (UK) (Lord Tipping). 
72. Interview with Jean Corston, Former Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(Oct. 15, 2008). 
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Despite this freedom, the JCHR’s task was not an easy one because of
the HRA’s controversial nature. Some Conservative Members of Parliament 
questioned why the United Kingdom needed a bill of rights and criticized
the European foundation of the specific rights incorporated into the HRA.73 
Several media outlets likewise panned the HRA and, although many prominent 
NGOs supported the HRA, the public certainly did not cry out for it.74 
The JCHR therefore needed to win over the government and the public to
promote human rights within the United Kingdom. 
It certainly has done so.  Over time, the JCHR has become a central entity 
through which the United Kingdom addresses human rights issues, despite 
the continuing controversial nature of the HRA itself.75  The JCHR therefore
presents a useful model for an American human rights committee. As
discussed more fully below, all three government branches have, to varying 
degrees, deferred to the JCHR’s expertise and used its recommendations 
to change existing and future laws.  It is likely that a congressional human
rights committee could do the same.
IV. A ROLE FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
In the United Kingdom, the JCHR has impacted human rights laws through 
its reports and investigative powers.  Specifically, the JCHR has influenced
the creation of legislation through focusing parliamentary debates, convincing
the executive to create or amend legislation, influencing judicial decisions, 
and organizing responses to relevant court cases.  The JCHR has also been 
a strong influence in the creation of a culture of human rights within the
government and the public.  If an American human rights committee could 
replicate the JCHR’s accomplishments, it would be a major asset in the
United States’ struggle to advance human rights.
A. Focusing Congressional Criticism on Pending Legislation 
One benefit of a human rights committee would be that it could report 
on the human rights impact of proposed legislation during Congressional
debates.  By doing so, a human rights committee could provide Congress with 
information, including the likely impact of prior Supreme Court judgments,
 73. JoAnne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using Its Past to Predict 
Its Future, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 39, 41, 63 (2010). 
74. Id. at 71–72, 76–77. 
75. Id. at 78–80. 
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as well as statements made by the cabinet, the bill’s proponents, NGOs,
and other experts, which Congress could use to inform its debates and
argue for amendments to a bill.  Substantial evidence supports the notion 
that Congress needs a source of information of how legislation will impact
human rights, particularly after September 11, when fear of future terrorist
attacks led to anti-terrorism laws that have been heavily criticized as
infringing upon human rights. 
For example, after the Supreme Court struck down President Bush’s program 
of using military commissions to try detainees who were suspected of
terrorism,76 Congress passed the Military Commission Act in 2006, which 
basically re-authorized the program.  One of the major criticisms levelled 
against the Military Commissions Act by members of Congress, NGOs77 
and even law school deans,78 was its prohibition on habeas corpus review 
for anyone who the military previously deemed “properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or . . . awaiting such determination.”79  Despite these 
criticisms, the bill received bipartisan support and passed both houses with 
wide margins: 65–34 in the Senate and 253–168 in the House.80  During 
the debates, Democrats argued against the bill on constitutionality grounds,
noting the Act’s effective elimination of habeas corpus.81 The Supreme Court 
ultimately agreed with the Democrats in Congress but was unable to hear 
the case and issue a decision until 2008.82 
While it is reassuring that the Supreme Court eventually corrected the 
unconstitutional habeas restrictions in the Military Commissions Act, it 
took two years for the Court to decide the issue, and several other controversial
parts of the Act remain.  A human rights committee may have made a difference
76. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley, The Military
Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 322, 
325 (2007).
77. FAQs: The Military Commissions Act, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Oct.
17, 2007), http://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/faqs­
military-commisions-act [https://perma.cc/5TG3-3539]. 
78. 152 CONG. REC. S10357 (Sept. 28, 2006). 
79. 10 U.S.C § 950g (2012).  The Act gives detainees the ability to appeal to the
D.C. Circuit but the appeal is limited to whether the detention is proper under the Military 
Commissions Act, as well as the Constitution and other United States laws, “to the extent 
applicable.” Bradley, supra note 76, at 330. 
80. Charles Babington, House Approves Bill on Detainees, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/27/AR20060927
01287.html [https://perma.cc/WX84-AQ35].  The bill passed 65–34 in the Senate and 253–168
in the House, with 34 Democrats joining 219 Republicans (all but seven) who voted in
favor of it.  “Senators also began debating the measure yesterday and defeated, along party
lines, a Democratic-sponsored amendment that would have expanded detainees’ legal rights.” 
Babington, supra. 
81. Id. 
82.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
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while Congress debated the Military Commissions Act and could have 
even prevented some of the controversial aspects of the bill from gaining
bipartisan support.  To that end, the United Kingdom’s JCHR shows the 
ways a human rights committee can increase and focus debates on human
rights concerns so that legislation is less likely to breach human rights. 
According to David Feldman, the JCHR’s former legal advisor, the
JCHR has “taken on a significant responsibility for furnishing each house 
the information and advice needed to undertake . . . [legislative] scrutiny.”83 
Unlike in the United States, the British executive branch introduces the 
vast majority of legislation and Parliament then debates the legislation.84 
Parliament also traditionally limits its scrutiny of legislation because it has
limited time, information, and no powers of investigation absent committee 
intervention.  For that reason, parliamentary committees commonly provide
information to Parliament and the JCHR’s reports therefore fit within existing 
parliamentary culture and role perceptions. 
Members of both Houses of Parliament use the JCHR’s reports to further 
their understanding of human rights issues so they can have a more informed 
debate on bills. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once the JCHR began
reporting on bills, parliamentary debates concerning human rights issues 
became more thorough and sophisticated.  According to the former Minister
of the Department of Constitutional Affairs, Harriet Harman, the JCHR 
“bec[a]me an important part of the constitutional and Parliamentary
architecture.”85  As some commentators have put it, the JCHR has become 
the legal advisor to Parliament on human rights issues.86 
The JCHR has the most influence in the House of Lords, which is
traditionally the revising chamber of Parliament.87  The Lords clearly rely 
upon the JCHR and its reports when scrutinizing legislation.  For example, 
the Lords requested and received assurances from the executive branch
 83. David Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights, 2002 
PUB. L. 323, 324 [hereinafter Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny].
84. Parliament and the Government, PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/about/
how/role/relations-with-other-institutions/parliament-government (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
85. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, LETTER TO THE
JCHR CHAIR FROM HON HARRIET HARMAN, MP (Mar. 6, 2006).  As discussed below, Ms. 
Harman is now the chair of the JCHR. 
86.  636 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2002) col. 1122 (UK) (Lord Lester); Dawn Oliver, 
Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills, 4 MACQUARIE L.J. 33, 49 (2004). 
87. To combat this unequal influence, the JCHR purposefully decided to have its 
chair be from the Commons so that it would have more impact on that House.  Interview 
with Raymond Plant, Member of the House of Lords (July 17, 2008). 
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that the JCHR would have sufficient time to report on the Antiterrorism,
Crime and Security Bill 2001 before they needed to vote on it.88  Similarly, 
and in a situation strikingly similar to the Military Commissions Act, the 
JCHR’s reports on the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc.) Bill in the 2003–04 Parliamentary Session generated such strong
parliamentary opposition that the executive ultimately decided to “water 
down” the provisions that excluded judicial review of almost all immigration 
proceedings.89 
Perhaps the most memorable clash between the Lords and the executive
came about because of the executive’s proposed amendment to the Counter- 
terrorism Bill in 2008.  Despite the JCHR’s concerns about the human
rights implications of several provisions in the Counter-terrorism Bill — 
as well as the United Kingdom’s existing anti-terrorism legislation—the 
executive decided to amend the bill to increase the amount of time the 
police can hold a suspect without charge from twenty-eight to forty-two
days.90  However, the amended bill barely passed the Commons, and the
Lords, using the JCHR’s reports, voted overwhelmingly—309 votes to 118— 
to amend the bill to remove the forty-two days provision.91  That vote ultimately 
caused the Minister to remove the provision.92 
Reading parliamentary debates also demonstrates the influence of JCHR 
reports.  The executive often refers to JCHR’s reports when the JCHR finds
that a bill complies with the HRA, and the Opposition highlights the reports 
when the JCHR finds noncompliance.93  For example, when the JCHR wrote 
positively about the Marriage Act 1949 (Remedial) Order 2006 in two of its 
reports, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, Baroness Ashton of Upholland brought both of these reports to 
the House of Lords’ attention when the Lords debated the bill.94
 88. Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny, supra note 83, at 345. 
89. David Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics and Politics into Law: Legislative
and Judicial Perspectives on Constitutional Human Rights, 34 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 
104, 118 (2005) [hereinafter Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics]; Oliver, supra note 86, 
at 35.
 90. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,TWENTY-FIRST REPORT:COUNTER-TERRORISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ELEVENTH REPORT): 42 DAYS AND PUBLIC EMERGENCIES, 2007–8,
HL 116, HC 635 (UK). 
91.  704 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2008) col. 542–43 (UK). 
92. Sam Coates, House of Lords Deals Fatal Blow to 42-Day Terror Detention Plans,
TIMES (London), Oct. 14, 2008, at 15.  For a full discussion of the evolution of the United 
Kingdom’s anti-terrorism laws (and the political battles that led to its various iterations), 
see JoAnne M. Sweeny, Indefinite Detention and Antiterrorism Laws: Balancing Security
and Human Rights, 34 PACE L. REV. 1190, 1230 (2014). 
93. See, e.g., 457 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2007) col. 1322 (UK) (Edward O’Hara) 
(criticizing the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill 2007). 
94.  688 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2007) col. 1301–02 (UK). 
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In addition to anecdotal evidence, empirical evidence shows that the
JCHR’s reports are influential because of the frequency of references to
JCHR reports during parliamentary debates.  To study the nature and
frequency of parliamentary references to JCHR Reports, the data used in 
this Article was collected by reading parliamentary debates from the 
2006–07 Parliamentary Session through the 2013–14 Parliamentary Session, 
focusing only on legislative scrutiny debates.95  This data has been further 
broken down and analyzed to isolate and parse several variables, including 
party affiliation and JCHR membership.  This data, therefore, presents
a sophisticated picture of how the JCHR influences parliamentary debates.
Chart 1 shows the average number of JCHR references per bill with a 
JCHR report,96 which was calculated by looking at each parliamentary
session and simply dividing the number of JCHR references by the number 
of bills with a JCHR report.  As the data shows, during the time period
studied, the House of Lords always referred more frequently to the JCHR 
than the Commons, which reflects the Lords’ legislative scrutiny role.
The average number of JCHR references per bill appears fairly constant
in both Houses until the 2012–13 session, where the average number of JCHR 
references began to increase for both Houses.
95. This data was collected by the author and two student research assistants reading 
parliamentary debates in Hansard and searching for either “Joint Committee on Human Rights”
or “JCHR.”  Other scholars have collected similar data for different time periods with slightly
differing criteria. See MURRAY HUNT, HAYLEY HOOPER & PAUL YOWELL, ARTS & HUM.
RES. COUNCIL, PARLIAMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REDRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
7–8 (Apr. 2012), http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/documents/project-reports-and-reviews/ahrc-public- 
policy-series/parliaments-and-human-rights-redressing-the-democratic-deficit/ [https://perma.cc/
MMA3-5UMP]; Francesca Klug & Helen Wildbore, Breaking New Ground: The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights and the Role of Parliament in Human Rights Compliance, 2007 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 231, 242. 
96. Due to factors such as timing or a bill’s unlikely impact on human rights, the 
JCHR does not issue a report on every bill introduced into Parliament. 
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As shown in Charts 2, 3, and 4, it is not just JCHR members or a few
Lords who discuss the JCHR and its reports.  As the data in Chart 2 shows,
the number of JCHR references from JCHR members is less than half of 
the references made by non-JCHR members in the House of Commons— 
and the numbers are starker for the House of Lords. Clearly, JCHR members
are not the only ones who use JCHR reports during legislative debates.
38
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Party affiliation is another potential confounding variable.  Some political 
parties have historically been more interested in human rights issues, which 
may mean that those parties dominate human rights discussions while the
parties that are uninterested in human rights issues remain silent and do 
not use JCHR reports.  As the data below shows, however, this is not the case; 
members of all political parties use JCHR reports. 
As shown in Chart 3, for the Commons, the Conservatives made the fewest 
references to the JCHR, which is unsurprising because the Conservative
Party opposed the HRA.  In contrast, Labour and the Liberal-democrats had 
the highest and second-highest number of JCHR references in the Commons, 
respectively.  This result is also not surprising because the Labour party created
the HRA and the Liberal-democrats championed the legislation; therefore,
their members are arguably more likely to discuss the HRA and the JCHR.
However, as the data shows, the number of Conservative references to the
JCHR is still quite high; only slightly below Liberal-Democrat references.
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Chart 4, which focuses on the party affiliation of the Lords, provides an 
interesting counterpoint.  As with the Commons, Labour and the Liberal-
democrats most frequently refer to the JCHR, while the Conservatives
invoke the JCHR a little more than half as often as members of those two
political parties. However, several Lords do not affiliate with a party and 
their references to the JCHR—almost as many as Conservative Lords— 
are therefore less likely to be politically motivated.  This data shows that 
although party affiliation has some impact on JCHR references—Labour 
and Liberal-democrats consistently reference the JCHR most often—both 
Conservatives and unaffiliated members also have a large amount of JCHR 
references. Overall, these results show that many different Members of
Parliament and Lords make JCHR references—not just JCHR members,
or Members of Parliament or Lords from one particular party.
Of course, in order to measure influence, it is not enough to note how 
often the JCHR was referenced.  The nature of those references must be 
ascertained.  In their 2006 report on the JCHR, Francesca Klug and Helen
Wildbore noted how many of the references made to the JCHR’s reports 
during the 2005–06 Parliamentary Session had a “significant impact,” which 
they defined as “relying on JCHR reports to (1) scrutinize a bill, (2) ask questions
40
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or, (3) engage substantively in debate.”97  This analysis was replicated 
here for the 2006–07 through 2013–14 Parliamentary Sessions.98 
As Chart 5 shows, both the Lords and the Commons are much more
likely to make a significant use of a JCHR Report than to just mention the 
JCHR in passing.  In the Lords, significant references are over twice as
likely as insignificant ones.  These results demonstrate that, in agreement 
with the anecdotal data provided above, Parliament not only recognizes 
the JCHR’s work but also uses its reports to inform Parliament’s legislative 
scrutiny. Accordingly, the JCHR has considerable power to raise human
rights issues for debate and can use this discourse to affect passage of Bills, 
especially in the House of Lords, where party affiliation is weaker.99 Even 
97. THE COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 83 tbl.4 & n.2. 
98. For example, in the 2007–08 Session, a “significant” reference was when Mr. 
Gibb used the JCHR’s scrutiny report on the Education and Skills Bill to ask the executive
when the guidance the JCHR requested for the Bill would be made available.  483 Parl Deb HC
(6th ser.) (2008) col. 75 (UK).  Insignificant references include when a Peer or MP mentioned
his or her membership in the JCHR or mentioned that the JCHR had reported on an issue 
without further reference to the report or its conclusions. 
99. See R.M. PUNNETT, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 304 (5th ed. 1987);
Interview with Jean Corston, supra note 72. 
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in the Commons, the JCHR can give the Opposition something to focus 
on to rally resistance to proposed legislation.100  Consequently, the JCHR 
greatly influences the legislature and assists it in focusing on human rights 
issues.
These results reveal a lot of potential for a congressional human rights 
committee.  Moreover, because of the strong separation of powers in the
United States, a congressional human rights committee could exercise greater
influence than the JCHR.  In the United States, a Congressional committee 
could begin influencing legislation, an even earlier stage because Congress
proposes legislation instead of the executive.  Moreover, as discussed below, 
the executive does not control Congress through strong party allegiance, 
allowing Congress more freedom to propose amendments to legislation
that run against the executive’s wishes or even the bill’s proponents’ wishes.  
With these freedoms, a human rights committee could speak with a powerful 
voice within Congressional debates. 
B. Prompting the Creation or Amendment of Legislation
Congress’ approval ratings have remained below thirty percent since 
October 2009,101 partially because voters are disillusioned with Congress, 
believe their representatives do not actually represent them, and are willing 
to sell their votes.102  The public also faults Congress’ refusal to pass 
legislation.103  In addition to refusing to pass budgets or vote on Supreme 
Court nominees, Congress recently failed to act on several human rights 
100. For example, as noted above, the Lords used the JCHR’s reports to oppose the 
executive’s proposed amendment to the Counter-terrorism Bill that would lengthen the 
amount of time that police can hold a suspect without charge to forty-two days.  703 Parl 
Deb HL (5th ser.) (2008) col. 200 (UK) (Lord Judd). 
101.  Justin McCarthy, U.S. Congress Approval Remains Low, GALLUP (Apr. 13, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/190598/congress-approval-remains-low.aspx; Frank Newport,
Congress Approval Jumps to 28%, Highest Since 2009, GALLUP (Feb. 7, 2017), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/203606/congress-job-approval-jumps-highest-2009.aspx?g
_source=CONGRESS&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles. 
102. Congressional Performance: Voters Still Down on Congress, RASMUSSEN REP. 
(July 8, 2016), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/ 
congressional_performance [https://perma.cc/54ZF-5KPP].
103. McCarthy, supra note 101. 
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issues including police misconduct,104 water safety,105 and gun control.106 
As a result, citizens formed several public interest groups to push these issues
forward and both state and federal governments began varying attempts 
to investigate or report on these human rights issues.107  However, 
comprehensive legislation in these areas remains elusive. 
Obstructionist members of Congress occasionally stymy even sizeable 
numbers of their colleagues. For example, Congress’s failure to act on
gun control legislation has been reported in the news every time there has
been a mass shooting, most recently culminating in a sit-in by Democratic
Senators and their allies.108 Despite their pleas for legislation and public
 104. Gabrielle Levy, Congress Left Behind in Rush for Police Reform, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 5, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/ 
05/congress-left-behind-in-rush-for-police-reform [https://perma.cc/GL2Q-DCJA].
105. MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RACISM 
THROUGH THE LENS OF FLINT (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/ 
MDCR_Flint_Water_Crisis_Report_552190_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RCZ-Q8SC]; Rebecca
Shabad, Why Congress Still Isn’t Helping Flint, CBS NEWS (May 5, 2016, 5:50 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-congress-still-isnt-helping-flint-water-crisis/ [https://
perma.cc/Q58J-EW6D].
106. Tom LoBianco et al., Senate Rejects Series of Gun Measures, CNN (June 20,
2016, 8:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/20/politics/senate-gun-votes-congress/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6VUX-N3PV].
107. For lists of public interest groups, see Kate Abbey-Lambertz, The Flint Crisis Will 
Last Decades, and These Groups Are in It for the Long Haul, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9,
2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/flint-water-lead-crisis-donations_ 
us_56b47a30e4b04f9b57d927dc [https://perma.cc/2E66-D9VF], and 9 Organizations Making 
Progress Towards Gun Control, GREAT NONPROFITS BLOG (Jan. 6, 2016), http://greatnon 
profits.org/nonprofitnews/9-organizations-making-progress-towards-gun-control/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TLX4-PRZ2], and Organizations Addressing Police Accountability and Racial 
Justice, FUNDERS FOR JUSTICE, http://fundersforjustice.org/organizations/ [https://perma.cc/
QG6B-S885] (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).  For examples of investigations into these crises, 
and the hurdles these investigations have to overcome, see Mark Berman, Chicago to
Release Evidence from 100 Investigations into Alleged Police Misconduct, WASH. POST
(May 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/05/28/chicago-
to-release-evidence-from-100-investigations-into-alleged-police-misconduct/?utm_term=.f69604 
86b5b6 [https://perma.cc/UHP4-B6DU], and Emanuella Grinberg, Baltimore Police have 
Racial Bias, Justice Department Reports, CNN (Aug. 10, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.
cnn.com/2016/08/09/us/baltimore-justice-department-report/ [https://perma.cc/G9KY-H7J5], 
and Chad Livengood, Schuette, Snyder Spar over Flint Water Investigations, DETROIT NEWS
(June 3, 2016, 4:05 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/03/schuette-
snyder-spar-flint-water-investigations/85359654/ [https://perma.cc/KSJ5-HFEE].  
108. Deirdre Walsh et al., Democrats End House Sit-In Protest over Gun Control, 
CNN (June 24, 2016, 1:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/22/politics/john-lewis-sit­
in-gun-violence/ [https://perma.cc/D6JT-FT5K].
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support for several gun control measures, however, Congress still failed
to pass or even seriously debate any gun control bill.109 
The water crisis in Flint, Michigan likewise failed to generate any
federal legislation, despite it being far less controversial.  A single Senator
perpetrated the most recent gridlock when he objected to how the relief 
for Flint would be funded.110  In contrast, Congress actively sought out whom
to blame for the disaster, holding multiple hearings and issuing reports,
but none of those hearings led to any tangible relief for Flint citizens and
Congress quietly closed the hearings in 2016.111  In addition, although both 
civil and criminal lawsuits have been initiated against Michigan officials who 
have been deemed responsible,112 according to the EPA, 5300 waterways in
the United States violate lead rules113 and the water situation in Flint still
has not been resolved.114 
Clearly, there has been a failure to help both the citizens of Flint and all 
the people affected by tainted water throughout the country.  The EPA, tasked 
with protecting the environment, has been criticized not only for failing
 109. Carl Hulse, Gun Control Wall, Bolstered by Republicans, Shows a Crack, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/us/politics/gun-control-republicans- 
congress.html?_r=0. 
110. Ted Barrett, Lawmakers Keep Flint Money out of Energy Bill, CNN (Apr. 14, 
2016, 10:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/13/politics/congress-flint-michigan-water­
funding/ [https://perma.cc/M3HL-FPS2].
111. Congress Grills Michigan Governor, EPA Head over Flint Water Crisis, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 17, 2016, 7:26 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress-grills­
michigan-governor-epa-head-over-flint-water-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/6WC4-5RQB]; Sara
Ganim, Flint Water Crisis: Did EPA Keep Memo About Lead Levels Under Wraps?, CNN 
(Mar. 14, 2016, 12:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/14/health/flint-water-epa-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/8WB7-64CT]; House GOP Quietly Ends Flint Water Investigation, CBS 
News (Dec. 16, 2016, 5:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/flint-water-investigation­
house-gop-quietly-ends/; Jonathan Oosting & Keith Laing, House Democrats Focus on
Snyder’s Role in Flint Crisis, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 15, 2016, 6:04 PM), http://www.
detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/03/15/watch-10-flint-water- 
congressional-hearings/81801706/ [https://perma.cc/U6PV-YXRM].
112. Stephanie Gosk, et al., ‘Failed Us All’: 3 Officials Hit with Charges in Flint Water 
Crisis, NBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2016, 11:13 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/flint­
water-crisis/3-officials-charged-over-flint-water-crisis-n559186; NAACP Files Lawsuit over
Flint Water Crisis, NAACP (May 18, 2016), http://www.naacp.org/latest/naacp-files­
lawsuit-flint-water-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/TT4V-DK5V]. 
113. Sara Ganim, 5,300 U.S. Water Systems Are in Violation of Lead Rules, CNN (June
29, 2016, 6:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/us/epa-lead-in-u-s-water-systems/ [https://
perma.cc/LX7T-ZUAS].
114. Matthew Dolan, Flint Water Woes Reach Beyond Lead in Drinking Supply, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 5, 2016, 10:24 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/ 
michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/06/05/flint-water-woes-reach-beyond-lead-drinking-supply/
85288850/ [https://perma.cc/8GKE-DX7G]; Feds Say Filtered Flint Drinking Water Is
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to help Flint, but not properly investigating, reporting on, or stopping
these legal violations from continuing across the country.115  Despite some
media coverage on the EPA’s failures, again sparked by the Flint disaster,
Congress shows no inclination to pass any legislation regarding water
purity, or even to call the EPA to task for its failure to enforce its own 
regulations.116 
Some of Congress’ inaction may be due to the perception that water
purity is an environmental issue and not a human rights one.  In addition, 
the fact that Congress failed to create a committee to report on these issues 
likely created another obstacle to any lasting change on this issue.  For 
these reasons, a congressional human rights committee would fill a major
gap and would convince Congress to pass legislation that improves the 
human rights of Americans.  Such a committee could become a central location 
for other agencies, NGOs and the public to provide information to Congress 
on human rights abuses.  A human rights committee could also hold hearings
and gather evidence on human rights issues and use its persuasive ability
to convince Congress to act. 
The JCHR shows how a legislative human rights committee can convince 
a legislature to act on human rights issues. In the United Kingdom, the 
executive proposes nearly all legislation and, without executive support,
Parliament will probably not pass the bill due to the strong party system
in the United Kingdom.  In this environment, the JCHR influences the 
creation of legislation because it convinces Ministers to justify their bills
on human rights grounds and amend legislation so that it will conform to 
European Convention rights.  The JCHR encourages the executive either
through direct communication with the relevant Minister or by informing
Parliament, which can lobby for changes.  The JCHR does this primarily 
through its thematic and legislative scrutiny reports. 
The JCHR often uses its thematic reports, which discuss broad areas of 
human rights concerns such as treatment of prisoners,117 to convince the
executive to change its policies.  The House of Commons in particular
 115. Ganim, supra note 113. 
116. Moreover, under Donald Trump and Secretary Scott Pruitt, there have been indications 
that the EPA’s activities may be curtailed or the agency may be abolished altogether. 
Arthur Nelsen, Donald Trump ‘Taking Steps to Abolish Environmental Protection Agency,’
GUARDIAN, (Feb. 1, 2017, 8:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/
donald-trump-plans-to-abolish-environmental-protection-agency [https://perma.cc/7YFG-4HWM].
117. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRD REPORT: DEATHS IN CUSTODY, 2004­
5, HL 137-I, HC 137-I (UK). 
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uses the JCHR’s thematic reports in its debates.118  The JCHR also monitors
and publishes the Minister’s response to its thematic reports.  Some Ministerial
responses to JCHR reports, such as the Justice Department’s response to
the JCHR’s concerns regarding the executive’s proposals to reform judicial
review, take the form of lengthy reports that answer the JCHR’s concerns
point by point.119  Moreover, if the JCHR deems the Minister’s response 
insufficient, the JCHR has shown itself capable of vigorous response.120 
With regard to its legislative scrutiny reports, early on, the JCHR decided 
to make scrutiny of bills its main priority as part of its “responsibility” to 
Parliament.121 The process for reviewing new proposed legislation is a
complicated one; legal advisors review all bills to determine their human
rights implications, the chair corresponds with the relevant Ministers, and
the committee produces reports and publishes them to the public.122  Since
2006, the JCHR has used a sifting process that reports on bills only if they
have “significant” human rights implications.123  The committee examines
five criteria: (1) the importance of the affected right, (2) the impact’s seriousness, 
(3) the strength of the interference’s justification, (4) the number of people 
affected, and (5) the vulnerability of the affected people.124
 118. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 70, 
at Letter to the Chair from Harriet Harman MP; Interview with Anthony Lester, Member 
of the House of Lords (May 19, 2008).  The Commons has less time for legislative scrutiny
than the Lords but it has a greater interest in wider policy concerns, which is exactly what
the JCHR’s thematic reports highlight.  In addition, most major bills start in the Commons, 
with the consequence that in a lot of cases the JCHR’s legislative scrutiny reports on those
bills have not been published in time to influence debate there. Thematic reports, on the other 
hand, are not under such time pressure and can be considered by Members of Parliament in 
more depth.
119. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS TO
REFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW (July 2014), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/ 
human-rights/Cm8896_Draft%20JCHR%20Response_110714_FINAL_WEB.PDF [https:// 
perma.cc/E7VM-A5UL].
120. For example, the JCHR issued several reports and worked with the British Institute
of Human Rights to publicize the executive’s lack of response to a court decision that
severely limited what entities would be subject to the HRA as “public authorities.  See infra p.
70 and accompanying notes. 
121. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FOURTEENTH REPORT: SCRUTINY REPORT
ON PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BILLS AND PRIVATE BILLS, 2001-2, HL 93, HC 674 (UK); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINETEENTH REPORT: THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN
THE 2001–2005 PARLIAMENT, 2004-5, HL 112, HC 552, at 46 (UK). 
122. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRD SPECIAL REPORT: SCRUTINY OF
BILLS, 2000-1, HL 73, HC 448 (UK); Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act, supra 
note 62, at 16–17; Interview with Murray Hunt, Legal Advisor to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (May 19, 2008). 
123. Id. at annex 1.
 124. THE COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 27. 
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When examining a bill, the JCHR looks to whether its provisions
themselves constitute a risk of violating human rights and whether the bill
leaves any gaps so that inadequate safeguards for rights exist on the face
of the bill.125  The JCHR’s reports discuss human rights issues in terms of 
the potential risk of a court, either a domestic court or the European Court 
of Human Rights, finding it incompatible with the European Convention.
The JCHR also seeks and receives evidence from third parties affected by
the bill at issue such as charities and human rights NGOs.126  The JCHR 
often attaches advice from NGOs to assist members of Parliament during 
debates.  In this way, the JCHR also acts as a liaison between the government 
and public interest groups.127  The JCHR also communicates with the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission to seek its views on legislation.128 
In addition to bill scrutiny, the JCHR also scrutinizes remedial orders,
which are “fast track” pieces of legislation that correct a legislative
incompatibility with the European Convention, and monitors the executive’s
responses to Declarations of Incompatibility, which are declarations by the
judiciary that a statute is incompatible with the European Convention.129 
In addition, he JCHR reviews the United Kingdom’s implementation of
European Court of Human Rights judgments and considers United Nations 
treaty bodies’ observations and conclusions.130  As a result of its wide-ranging 
powers, the JCHR’s influence in the creation or amendment of legislation
comes primarily through the JCHR’s ability to obtain information about a
bill from the executive while Parliament debates a bill, and its effectiveness 
in proposing amendments to bills. 
125. Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 111. 
126. Anthony Lester, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights
Act 1998, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1, 13 (2002). 
127. Janet Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist
Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1963, 1978 (2003)
[hereinafter Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas].
128. See, e.g., Letter from Baroness O’Neill, Chair, Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, to Hywel Francis, Chair, Joint Committee on Human Rights (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/Baroness-ONeill-on-
Enterprise-Regulatory-Reform-Bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX2U-F3UT]. 
129. THE COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, supra note 16, at 6. 
130. Id.
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1. Requesting Information—Section 19 Statements of 
Compatibility
Under Section 19 of the HRA, when a Minister introduces any Bill into 
Parliament, he or she must state either that the bill corresponds with
European Convention rights or that the bill is not compatible but the
Minister wishes Parliament to proceed with it anyway.131  The statement 
of compatibility does not explicitly prohibit the executive from proposing
legislation that may violate human rights, but it does present significant 
political obstacles such as increased parliamentary scrutiny —especially
from the JCHR and the Opposition—and public disapproval.132 
According to former Home Secretary Jack Straw, legal advisors will 
only recommend that the minister make a statement of compatibility if “it
is more likely than not that the provisions of the Bill will stand up to challenge 
on European Convention grounds before the domestic courts and the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.”133  The statement of compatibility 
therefore ensures that the executive analyses the human rights impact of a
bill before it presents the bill to Parliament because the Minister must draft 
and issue the statement of compatibility before a Bill’s second reading.134 
The executive must also take into account possible questioning by the 
JCHR, and any debates that this questioning may provoke.135  However,
Section 19 does not dictate what must be in the statement or that the
statement must be justified or explained.136 
131. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 § 19 (Eng.) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1998/42/section/19 [https://perma.cc/RQE3-3DBV]; RODNEY BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT 10 (3d ed. 1999). 
132. Ewing, supra note 64, at 96–97; Murray Hunt, The Human Rights Act and Legal 
Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal Profession, 26 J.L. & SOC. 86, 89–90 (1999). 
133.  330 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1999) col. 371 (UK) (Written Answers). 
134.  Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42. § 19(1). 
135. Francesca Klug has implied that statements of compatibility are insufficient to
ensure that the executive will comply with the HRA because the government may repeatedly
enact violating legislation and then deny it. FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS 
AGE: THE STORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 173–74 (2000); see also
Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act, supra note 64, at 12.  In such situations, 
it is up to the Joint Committee on Human Rights and Parliament (the Opposition, most
likely) to bring all elements of the Bill to light so that the full implications of the Bill may 
be discussed and weighed.
136. Despite Parliament’s attempts to amend the HRA to require Ministers to give
reasons for their Section 19 statements, the executive refused.  583 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.)
(1997) col. 1163 (UK) (Lord Irvine); 317 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1998) col. 1350 (UK)
(Mike O’Brian); 321 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1998) cols. 1–2 (UK) (Written Answers)
(Fiona Mactaggart); 595 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1998) cols. 1–2 (UK) (Written Answers)
(Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate); 595 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1998) col. 116 (UK)
(Written Answers) (Lord Lester); HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 83, at 36.  Interestingly,
the Under-Secretary of State for Home Department, Mike O’Brien, MP, suggested that a 
48
SWEENY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2018 11:18 AM     
 
    
 















   
  














     
  
[VOL. 54:  21, 2017] To Protect Human Rights 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Section 19 perhaps would have remained of no consequence if the JCHR 
had not seized upon it and used it as a tool to make the executive more
accountable. Through the JCHR’s growing influence, it persuaded the
executive to give more thorough explanations in its Section 19 statements,137 
though some departments still require the JCHR to repeatedly ask for
a statement of compatibility.138  According to the Cabinet Office’s most 
recent Guide to Making Legislation, the executive made “a commitment
to give an assessment of the most significant human rights issues thought
to arise from each bill.”139  The Guide also states that:
the assessment of the impact of the bill’s provisions on the European Convention
rights should be as detailed as necessary, setting out any relevant case law and
presenting the executive’s reasons for concluding that the provisions in the bill are
either compatible with the European Convention or why if unable to make a statement
of compatibility, the [executive] nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with
the Bill.140 
joint committee could inquire regarding Section 19 statements and report to Parliament to
better inform its debates.  317 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (1998) col. 1350 (UK).  However, 
this comment was never followed up with any questions or further statements and appears
to have been largely forgotten by the time the HRA was enacted.
137. 630 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2001) col. 43 (UK) (Written Answers); 643 Parl
Deb HL (5th ser.) (2003) col. 154 (UK) (Written Answers); Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny, 
supra note 83, at 339. 
138. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY UPDATE, 2012­
13, HL 157, HC 1077, ¶¶ 73–75 (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/
jtselect/jtrights/157/15707.htm#a20 [https://perma.cc/2YWD-LGMT] [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY UPDATE].
139. CABINET OFFICE, GUIDE TO MAKING LEGISLATION, 2015, ¶ 11.80, https://www. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/450239/Guide_to_Mak
ing_Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN9P-UZ42]. 
140. Id. § 11.80, at 86.  Since 1998, there have been only two statements of
incompatibility under Section 19(b).  David Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the 
UK Legislative Process, 25 STATUTE L. REV. 91, 98–99 (2004).  The first bill was the
Local Government Bill 1998 wherein the House of Lords blocked the Commons’ attempt
to section 28, which had forbidden the promotion of homosexuality.  The executive warned 
that this amendment could be incompatible with the Convention and required a statement
of incompatibility.  Section 28 was later removed in the Local Government Act 2003.  The 
other bill, the Communications Bill 2003, was later approved by the JCHR (after the executive
explained its reasoning) and upheld by the Law Lords as not violating the Convention.  R
(on the application of Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15 (appeal taken from Eng.), http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080312/animal.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7NK-GMVH];
395 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2002) col. 789 (UK); Tom Lewis, Political Advertising and 
the Communications Act 2003: Tailored Suit or Old Blanket?, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 290,
292 (2005).  The European Court of Human Rights recently agreed that the Communications 
 49
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One commentator has suggested that due to Section 19, a number of bills
include provisions so that the minister could certify the bill’s compatibility
“because otherwise the minister would have had to draw Parliament’s
attention to what was incompatible with the Convention.”141 
In addition, since 2006, the JCHR has increased its role in pre-legislative
scrutiny.142  Due to its efforts, executive departments sometimes consult
with the JCHR before publishing a bill or amendment. For example, before
proposing amendments to the Crime (International Co-operation) Bill that 
was before the Lords, the Home Office wrote to the JCHR to explain the 
amendments.143  Additionally, civil servants sometimes contact the legal 
advisor to the JCHR to ascertain whether the bill they are working on will 
be acceptable to the JCHR.144  Further, over time, the executive has submitted
a significant number of draft bills for public consultation and JCHR 
reporting, such as the Draft Communications Bill, the Draft Extradition
Bill and the Draft Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Bill.145 According to 
Feldman, due to early communications between the JCHR and executive
Departments, the executive introduces more bills with fewer or no potential 
human rights concerns.146  There has also been an increase in legislation that
improves human rights, such as the Equality Act 2006, which created the 
Commission for Equality and Human Rights.
Act did not violate the Convention.  See Tom Lewis, Animal Defenders International v United
Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of Strasbourg Jitters?, 77 MOD. L. REV. 460,
460–474 (2014).
141. Interview with Judicial Studies Board member (May 8, 2008).  However, the bare
fact that a Minister made a statement of compatibility does not guarantee that the legislation
complies with the HRA.  Quite a few times, the executive has stated that a bill comports 
with the HRA even though the JCHR and courts later disagree. The Prevention of Terrorism 
Act is a good example of this effect. See Sweeny, supra note 73, at 1221–29. 
142. THE COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, supra note 16, ¶ 55. 
143. Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, supra
note 140, at 110; Letter from Lord McNally, Minister of State, to Lord Hywel Francis, JCHR 
Chair (Mar. 2013), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/Ld_
McNally_Draft_Inheritance_and_Trustees_Powers_Bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX2E-U6A5].
144. Oliver, supra note 86, at 43; Interview with Jean Corston, supra note 72; see 
also Letter from Theresa May, Home Sec’y, to Hywel Francis, JCHR Chair (June 13, 2013),
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/Theresa_May_Draft_ 
Communications_Data_Bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7Y5-9PHW] (executive inviting JCHR
to participate in pre-legislative scrutiny); Letter from Lord McNally, Minister of State, to 
Hywel Francis, JCHR Chair, supra note 143.  The Home Office even created a parliamentary
clerk who regularly liaises with the JCHR about existing bills and the Home Office’s future
legislation plans. Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 117. 
145. Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, supra note 
140, at 92–93. 
146. Id. at 93. 
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2. Recommendations for Amendments 
In addition to seeking information, the JCHR also recommends to Ministers
that they amend proposed legislation to conform to the European Convention’s 
requirements after the executive introduces bills into Parliament.147  During 
the 2007–08 Parliamentary Session, the JCHR began to propose specific
amendments to bills it scrutinized instead of simply suggesting that Parliament
make changes to conform to the JCHR’s general recommendations.148  It
did so with the intention that these amendments would be more persuasive
and would allow JCHR members to table and argue for these amendments
in both Houses.149  The executive initially resisted this endeavor and spoke
against it during parliamentary debates.150  In response, the JCHR resolved
to continue proposing amendments despite the executive’s “reluctance to
engage with our amendments on the floor of the House,” declaring that the 
Minister’s reaction was “encouragement to continue.”151  Since those initial 
scuffles, the JCHR has continued to propose amendments and the controversy
of doing so appears to have died down.
The JCHR has also influenced Parliament to block or delay a bill, which 
forces the executive to make changes.  Because Parliament must pass a bill 
during each parliamentary session or the executive must reintroduce the
legislation, time pressure can kill a bill.  For example, the House of Lords 
forced the executive to include additional safeguards in the Criminal Justice
and Police Bill because the Lords delayed the bill’s passage and the executive
wanted to pass the legislation before the 2001 general election.152
 147. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SEVENTEENTH REPORT: LEGISLATIVE 
SCRUTINY:1) EMPLOYMENT BILL; 2) HOUSING AND REGENERATION BILL; 3) OTHER BILLS, 
2007-8, HL 95, HC 501, ¶¶ 1.29–1.30 (UK). 
148. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTH REPORT: THE WORK OF THE
COMMITTEE IN 2007 AND THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK, 2007-8, HL 38, HC 
270, ¶¶ 36–40 (UK). 
149. Id.; JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTEENTH REPORT: LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY, 2007-8, HL 81, HC 440, ¶¶ 3.3–3.4 (UK) [hereinafter FIFTEENTH REPORT:
LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY].
of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, supra note 140, at 104.  As noted above, the 
150. Id.
 151. Id.
 152. Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny, supra note 83, at 341; Feldman, The Impact 
Lords’ vote to remove the 42-days provision from the Counter-terrorism bill caused
the executive to remove the provision.  Coates, supra note 92. 
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Empirical data can also be used to calculate the JCHR’s ability to convince
the executive to propose amendments to legislation.153  The following data
was gathered by focusing on the 2001–02 to 2013–14 Parliamentary Sessions 
and reading JCHR legislative scrutiny reports, Parliamentary debates discussing
all bills that the JCHR recommended be amended, and all of the versions
of those same bills to see if they were actually amended.  Although the results 
depend on external factors such as the JCHR’s changing practices, the subject 
matter of the legislation, and the Department from which the legislation 
came, some useful observations can be made regarding the interactions
between the JCHR and the executive. 
Chart 6 shows how often the executive made a change to a bill that the 
JCHR recommended be amended.  Some changes could be specifically
attributed to the JCHR through a statement made during a parliamentary 
debate, in a JCHR report, or in correspondence between the JCHR and the
relevant Minister.  Other changes were coded as “ambiguous” because there
was no direct link to the JCHR. In addition, any amendment to a bill was
coded as a “change” to the bill even if the executive did not include some 
of the JCHR’s requested amendments.  On the other hand, the addition 
of guidance or other assurances that did not affect the text of the bill were not
recorded as “changes” to the bill. 
153. Other measures of the JCHR’s effectiveness have been suggested by academics 
such as “encouraging ‘civil society’ to participate in public debate about the appropriateness or
justification of government action.”  Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act, supra
note 62, at 37. 
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On average, the executive was slightly less likely to amend a bill than 
not, but JCHR changes were more likely than non-JCHR changes.  Specifically, 
the JCHR has an average of a 28% success rate in convincing the executive 
to make at least one change to a proposed bill.  In contrast, non-JCHR or 
ambiguous efforts were a little over half as effective at 16%. 
However, this data presents only a partial picture. This data cannot capture
the informal pressure the JCHR can place on the executive generally;
without an explicit request for a change by the JCHR and a response by 
the executive, there is no official record of the JCHR’s influence on the 
executive. Similarly, any bills that the executive altered before being presented
to Parliament could not be included in this data. On the other hand, the
data does not show how satisfied the JCHR was with the changes to each
bill154 or whether the changes resulted in a combined effort from the JCHR 
and Parliament.155 
All in all, although this data presents only a partial picture, it is still a 
promising one.  Because the executive is extremely unlikely to be forced 
to amend legislation by members of Parliament, any change the JCHR has 
convinced the executive to make therefore represent a substantial success 
for the JCHR.  Moreover, the fact that almost twice as many legislative 
changes can be explicitly attributed to the JCHR than to any other reason shows 
that the JCHR is significantly influencing the executive. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of a human rights committee would likely
be even greater in the United States, where there is a stronger system of checks
and balances. Instead of merely delaying a bill, members of Congress in
either House can fully block a bill’s passage.  A strong human rights committee156 
can use this dynamic to ensure that a bill that negatively affects human rights 
does not reach the President for signature. At the very least, such a committee 
could raise enough concerns that a Presidential veto may be more likely.
154. As noted by the JCHR’s former legal advisor, the amendments that are made by the 
executive typically do not change the substance of the bill and only put in minor safeguards 
such as review or sunset clauses.  Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny, supra note 83, at 346. 
155. See Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 117; Oliver, supra
note 86, at 35. 
156. The qualities that could make a human rights committee stronger and more influential 
in Congress are discussed more fully in Part IV.  See infra Part IV, section D.
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C. Influencing the Judiciary 
In addition to influencing Congressional debates, a human rights committee 
also could educate and influence the judiciary to ensure that American laws 
better protect human rights.  Specifically, a human rights committee could: 
(1) argue for a more human-rights compatible interpretation of ambiguous
legislation or provide a more robust legislative history for courts to use 
when considering a statute’s intended impact on human rights, and (2) organize 
a response to court judgments that either positively or negatively impact 
human rights so Congress can fix the problem by amending existing
legislation or creating new laws. 
1. Influencing Judicial Decisions 
When interpreting legislation, courts often used the legislative record 
created by committee reports and hearings.  In the United States, courts
commonly examine a bill’s legislative history to determine Congress’s 
intent, and courts will strike down federal statutes on the basis of an insufficient
legislative record.157  For example, the Supreme Court held that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was beyond Congress’s enforcement powers because
Congress failed to show in the statute’s legislative history that an actual
problem with religious bigotry existed for Congress to address.158  When
making its decision, the Supreme Court specifically looked at and criticized
testimony presented to a congressional committee as to the justification
for the statute.159  Accordingly, a congressional human rights committee could 
assist in creating an adequate record for legislation that affects human rights.  
As discussed below, the JCHR shows how a human rights committee can
create a legislative record that can influence judicial opinions on human 
rights issues. 
In the United Kingdom, courts increasingly use the JCHR’s reports as 
either persuasive authority or to generally inform their judgments.  Under 
the seminal case Pepper v. Hart, the British judiciary may consider a statute’s
legislative history only if the statute is ambiguous.160 In such situations, 
JCHR reports have been useful to courts because the JCHR has often already 
considered the human rights compatibility issue before the court.  When 
introduced into evidence, courts may use the JCHR’s reports to access the
JCHR’s opinions on compatibility, the Minister’s responses to the JCHR’s
 157. Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny, supra note 83, at 330. 
158. Id. at 347 (discussing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). 
159. Id.  Commentators have shown concern that Congress may divert too many resources
to ensuring that its committee hearings and reports create a record that will satisfy the
judiciary, instead of fulfilling their other functions such as informing the public.  Id. at 388. 
160.  [1992] UKHL 3. 
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questions, and the extensive parliamentary debates the report inspired.161 
Perhaps most importantly, the JCHR includes evidence in its reports regarding 
the Minister’s purposes for the legislation, which may contradict the Minister’s
later statements during later litigation.162 
Looking at British court cases shows that courts do use the information 
provided by the JCHR to inform their judgments. The following data was 
gathered by searching British court cases for the terms “JCHR” or variations
on “Joint Committee on Human Rights” during the years 2000–14. All 
references to the JCHR were considered, including references to the JCHR’s
thematic reports.  Only cases where HRA issues were seriously considered
and discussed in some detail were included.163  In addition, if multiple courts 
considered the same case, each court that referenced the JCHR was included, 
even if that case was later reviewed by a higher court. 
As shown in Chart 7, courts used many different kinds of information
provided by the JCHR.  Courts cite legislative scrutiny reports, thematic
reports, and the JCHR’s correspondence with the executive.
161.  Interview with Murray Hunt, supra note 122. 
162. In the past, Parliamentary authorities attempted to prevent courts from considering
the JCHR’s reports and, more specifically, the executive’s statements that are appended to
those reports, under a theory of protecting Parliament’s right to free speech under Article 
9 of the Bill of Rights 1689.  Interview with Hunt, supra note 122; Interview with Lester, 
supra note 118.  Some courts have upheld this reasoning for other parliamentary reports 
but none have done so for the JCHR.  See The Queen on the application of Henry Bradley,
Robin Duncan, Andrew Parr, Thomas Waugh v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2007] EWHC 242, [35] (Admin); Office of Government Commerce v. Information
Commissioner [2008] EWHC 737, [30], [61] (Admin); The Queen (on the application of 
Wheeler) v. Office of the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs [2008] EWHC 1409, [53]–[54] (Admin). However, the Law Lords continue to use 
the JCHR’s reports as persuasive evidence, see R (on the application of Animal Defenders 
International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [14],
and it appears that this argument is not being pursued any longer, at least with respect to the
JCHR’s reports.
163. This restriction is not used in a similar analysis contained in the Arts and Humanities
Research Council’s recent report, which led to, unsurprisingly, a larger number of reported
cases where the JCHR was mentioned.  Hunt, Hooper & Yowell, supra note 95, at 46. 
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Generally, the JCHR’s legislative scrutiny reports appear as the most 
popular source of information for courts and litigants.  The second most 
popular part of JCHR reports are their communications with the executive.
Interestingly, almost as popular as communications with the executive are 
thematic reports, which do not focus on a particular statute.  Instead, these
reports focus on general human rights issues in the United Kingdom, 
which courts clearly find informative when deciding cases.  Similarly,
courts also sometimes reference the general existence of JCHR reports on 
a topic without examining what the reports said.  These shallower references,
although they appear dismissive, actually may indicate that courts will use 
JCHR reports as a general source of information, even if there is no specific
report on the legal issue in question.
Perhaps the best indication of the JCHR’s influence over the courts is
how often the courts agree with the JCHR’s conclusions.  Chart 8 provides 
that information. 
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As Chart 8 shows, courts were more likely to agree with the JCHR’s 
conclusions than disagree. However, courts are far more likely to use a
JCHR report in a way that is not directly applicable to the court’s holding. 
Courts may make these references to executive communications with the 
JCHR where the court makes no reference to the JCHR’s actual findings, 
or they may reference the general discussion of JCHR reports on a wider 
topic than the one at issue.  Either way, as discussed above, the “general
reference” findings suggest that courts use JCHR reports for information 
or to signify that the JCHR addressed related issues in a report, which
indicates that courts know about JCHR reports even if the reports do not
directly relate to the cases they are deciding.  Instead, the JCHR and its reports 
make up the general legal landscape when a case involves human rights issues.
These findings, although not conclusive proof, imply that American courts 
would likewise use a congressional human rights committee’s reports 
when considering human rights issues.  Indeed, American courts are more
likely to consider a legislative committee report because American courts
may consider legislative history without limitation, unlike British courts.
Further, not only would a human rights committee report on Congress’ reason
for enacting legislation that impacts human rights, but the committee’s
 57
























   
 
  
   
general findings on human rights issues would also help courts grapple with
these often-complex issues.  Moreover, as shown below, a human rights
committee could also monitor court decisions impacting human rights and
bring its findings to Congress, which would be especially useful if a court 
decision negatively impacted human rights in a way Congress did not 
intend. 
2. Organizing Responses to Court Judgments 
Even with the most thorough legislative history, sometimes courts still 
interpret statutes in a way of which the legislature disapproves.  When the
Supreme Court issues a decision that negatively impacts human rights, the
only recourse is for Congress to pass legislation—or a constitutional 
amendment—to override the decision.  For instance, the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act overrode the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., which held that an employee was time-barred from 
filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC for any employment decision
that occurred more than 180 days before the EEOC filing, even if the employee 
discovered the disparate treatment after the 180-day filing time period.164 
Congress did not intend that result and it eventually took action with
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  It drafted The Fair Pay Act shortly after 
the Supreme Court decision in Ledbetter, which explicitly abrogated the 
Supreme Court’s holding by stating that, with regard to compensation, an 
unlawful employment practice occurs every time a person receives that
discriminatory compensation.165  The statute’s legislative history—and its
name—makes it very clear that this statute was intended to overrule the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.166 
However, despite Congress’ clear intention to remedy what it perceived 
as a wrong decision by the Supreme Court, the passage of the Fair Pay Act 
was far from smooth.  Instead, the Fair Pay Act languished in Congress for 
months during the Bush Administration and Bush stated he would veto 
164.  431 U.S. 553, 553–55 (1977). 
165. Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
166. H.R. REP. 110-237, 1–2 (2007) (“The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., No. 05–1074 (May 29, 2007), significantly impairs statutory
protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress established and that have 
been bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decision undermines 
those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time period in which victims 
of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or 
other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
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the Act if Congress passed it during his tenure.167  It was only passed by 
Congress after President Obama came into office; President Obama proudly
signed it as his first piece of legislation.168 
Although the Fair Pay Act is an example of Congress successfully “correcting” 
a Supreme Court decision that negatively impacted civil rights, Congress
likely could have proceeded more effectively and swiftly with the support
of a human rights committee.  As shown by the work of the JCHR, after
a court issues a harmful decision, a human rights committee can focus the
efforts of the legislature and keep sustained pressure on the executive to
ensure that the negative effects of the judicial decision are ameliorated as
soon as possible. 
In the United Kingdom, the JCHR monitors court decisions that impact 
human rights and reports on them to Parliament and the executive, either 
to convince Parliament to enforce or build upon the court’s decision, or to 
abrogate it with legislation.  For example, after the JCHR wrote to the 
Minister of Health regarding the proposed amendments to the Mental Health
Act 1983—after it was declared incompatible with the European Convention
by the Law Lords—the Minister withdrew the draft Bill and substituted it 
with a “fast-track” remedial order as the JCHR suggested.169 
In addition, when a court issues a decision that the JCHR believes 
negatively impacts human rights, the JCHR moves just as quickly to repair
the damage.  For example, in YL v. Birmingham City Council and Others, 
the Law Lords narrowly defined “public authority” in the HRA so that 
private care homes did not fall under the remit of the HRA – even though
those homes exercised duties similar to those formerly conducted by the 
city council – because the homes undertook those duties for a different
purpose and not under any statutory duty.170 Even before the court decided
YL, the JCHR published a thematic report on the issue, noting that courts 
inconsistently defined “public authority” and warning that a narrow 
definition—which was later adopted in YL—could result in the inadequate 
167. Lori Montgomery, White House Threatens to Veto Discrimination Bill, WASH.
POST (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/22/
AR2008042202696.html. 
168. Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 499, 509 (2010); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html?_r=0. 
169. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTH REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983
(REMEDIAL) ORDER 2001, 2000-1 HL 57, HC 472 (UK) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT: MENTAL 
HEALTH ACT 1983 (REMEDIAL) ORDER 2001].
170.  [2007] UKHL 27. 
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protection of human rights.171  The JCHR report also criticized the executive
for failing to take any action on this matter.172 
Also before YL was decided, the JCHR organized a conference on the 
subject with the British Institute of Human Rights, which generated some
publicity.173  Additionally, the JCHR’s chair introduced a bill in Parliament
to clarify the meaning of public authority and, although the executive did 
not support the bill, the Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice 
did state that if the Law Lords did not correct the problem in YL, the executive
would take action that same year.174 
After YL was decided, the executive proposed the Health and Social Care
Bill, which did not address the “public authority” controversy.  However,
the JCHR used the introduction of that bill, which discussed related issues,
as an opportunity to correspond with the relevant Minister and publish
multiple legislative scrutiny reports criticizing the executive for failing to
address YL or the JCHR’s earlier thematic report.  For example, in its first 
report on the Health and Social Care Bill, the JCHR summarized the YL 
decision, criticized it and the executive’s failure to take the promised action, 
and recommended legislative amendments to the Health and Social Care
Bill.175 
As Parliament debated the Health and Social Care Bill, JCHR members
proposed amendments to the bill that correlated with the JCHR’s prior 
report.176  The executive did not agree to adopt the proposed amendments,
but it again promised to fully consider the matter as Parliament debated.177 
In response to the executive’s criticisms of the JCHR’s proposed amendments, 
the JCHR proposed new amendments to the bill in a subsequent legislative 
scrutiny report.178  As a result of its persistence, the executive at last proposed
an amendment to the Health and Social Care Bill specifically designed to
 171. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT: THE MEANING OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, 2006-7, HL 77, HC 410, ¶¶ 39, 41, 47, 138
(UK).
172. Id. ¶ 11. 
173. SIXTH REPORT: THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN 2007 AND THE STATE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UK, supra note 148, ¶ 79; Samuel Mithran, Minister to Assess Wrongful Evictions, 
COMMUNITY CARE (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2008/01/30/minister-to­
assess-wrongful-evictions/ [https://perma.cc/6PV9-FBZT]. 
174. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTH REPORT: LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY:
HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE BILL, 2007-8, HL 46, HC 303, ¶ 1.10 (UK). 
175. Id. ¶¶ 1.07–1.21. 
176. FIFTEENTH REPORT: LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY, supra note 149, ¶¶ 1.2–1.3.
177. Id. 
178. Id. ¶¶ 3.13–3.18. 
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overrule YL, which expanded the definition of public authority for certain
private entities that provide social care services.179 
This anecdotal evidence shows that the JCHR presents a good model 
for a congressional human rights committee.  By following relevant court
cases and keeping pressure on Congress, a human rights committee can ensure 
that Congress protects human rights if the courts fail to do so.  Moreover, 
a congressional human rights committee can ensure that courts fully understand 
Congress’ intentions with regard to the protection of human rights in legislation 
by preserving a full legislative history that courts can use when interpreting 
federal statutes.
3. Using Judicial Decisions to Influence Future Legislation 
A human rights committee can also use the threat of judicial intervention 
to ensure that proposed legislation sufficiently protects human rights.  In 
the United States, the Constitution’s framers intended to create conflict
between the three branches of government, and the judiciary has been a 
check on the power of Congress and the President since Marbury v.
Madison.180  However, state officials, members of Congress and, more
recently, the President, have seemed surprised at the ability of courts to 
determine the constitutionality of legislation or executive orders.181 
In contrast, both the JCHR and the British executive appear very much
aware that courts will ultimately decide whether a statute comports with 
the European Convention and when they negotiate regarding a bill’s
amendments, court disapproval is a constant background threat that both
sides use.  For example, in response to the JCHR’s criticisms, the executive
frequently argues that a statute that gives wide regulation-making power 
will not violate the HRA because judges can rule a regulation invalid if it 
does.182  In addition, there have been a few instances where the executive
 179. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-THIRD REPORT: LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY: GOVERNMENT REPLIES, 2007-8, HL 126, HC 755 (UK). 
180. Theodore B. Olson, Remembering Marbury v. Madison, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 35, 42 
(2003).
181. See, e.g., Kevin Liptak, Trump Just Got Checked and Balanced, CNN POLITICS
(Feb. 4, 2017, 3:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donald-trump-travel­
ban/; S.M., Can Congress Over-Ride a Supreme Court Decision?, ECONOMIST (July 28, 
2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/07/rights-and-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/94MM-5W6B].
182. The executive has also repeatedly refused to place specific guidance on the face 
of a bill and has instead chosen to rely on public authorities to comply with the HRA because 
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resisted taking the JCHR’s advice and instead chose to wait to see if the
judiciary would find a bill incompatible with European Convention rights.183 
The executive, therefore, appears to be willing to let the judiciary curb
any abuses instead of crafting legislation that will minimize them.184  By
doing so, the executive may be allowing the judiciary to deal with unpopular
and controversial issues so that the executive can maintain popular support.185 
On the other hand, when the European Court of Human Rights hands 
down a judgment against the United Kingdom, the executive shows itself 
to be very aware that it must respond.186 The JCHR has consequently 
adopted a judicial style of assessing compatibility of bills that focuses heavily 
on the whether or not British courts or the European Court of Human
rights will find a bill incompatible with the HRA.187  This approach has
the benefit of the support of the judiciary and the threat of a Declaration 
of their general section 6 duties to do so.  This approach has been criticized as being less
reliable protector of human rights.  Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative
Process, supra note 140, at 103–04. 
183. For example, the executive informed the JCHR that it would not seek to bring 
forth new anti-terrorism legislation, despite the JCHR’s concerns with the existing Prevention 
of Terrorism Act, until the Supreme Court had ruled on the issue.  JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, TWELFTH REPORT: COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9) ORDER
2006, 2005-6, HL 122, HC 915 (UK). 
184. This technique was particularly evident in the wake of legal challenges to the 
Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH 
REPORT: CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 21 TO 23 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME 
AND SECURITY ACT 2001, 2002-3, HL 59, HC 462 (UK); JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SIXTH REPORT: ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001: STATUTORY
REVIEW AND CONTINUANCE OF PART 44, 2003-4, HL 38, HC 381 (UK).  The executive’s 
reliance on the courts may be a good strategy because, as noted by some commentators, 
British courts have been very deferential to the executive whereas the JCHR can be quite
critical. See, e.g., MERRIS AMOS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15–33 (2d. ed. 2014); Janet L. Hiebert, 
The Human Rights Act: Ambiguity About Parliamentary Sovereignty, 14 GERMAN L.J.
2253, 2257 (2013) (citing JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: SIXTEENTH REPORT:
MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO COURT JUDGMENTS FINDING BREACHES OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 2006-7, HL 128, HC 728 (UK)).
185. Unsurprisingly, the JCHR objects to this strategy, particularly because by relying on
courts to fix compatibility problems, a violation will necessarily already have taken place.
NINETEENTH REPORT, THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN THE 2001–2005 PARLIAMENT, supra
note 121, at 82. 
186. Letter from Chris Grayling, Lord Chancellor, to Hywel Francis, JCHR Chair (Nov.
22, 2012), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/Letter_
from_Mr_Grayling_on_Prisoner_Voting.pdf [https://perma.cc/44YR-WETV].
187. Lester, supra note 126, at 16–17.  It has been argued that the JCHR has limited itself 
by relying so heavily on the United Kingdom’s existing legal obligations to determine
whether human rights are implicated.  See, e.g., Carolyn Evans & Simon Evans, Legislative
Scrutiny Committees and Parliamentary Conceptions of Human Rights, 2006 PUBLIC LAW
785, 803; Klug & Wildbore, supra note 95, at 243; Danny Nicol, The Human Rights Act
and the Politicians, 24 LEGAL STUD. 451, 454 (2004). 
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of Incompatibility—a non-binding declaration that a statute is incompatible 
with the European Convention—or unwanted judicial interpretation as a 
coercive tool against the executive.188 At the very least, the threat of a legal 
challenge forces the executive to consider human rights issues more closely
as it drafts legislation.189 This effect can even trickle down to employees of 
public authorities when they implement legislation.190 The courts also play
into this dynamic by citing the JCHR’s reports as well as existing British
and European Court of Human Rights case law when they find a bill to be 
incompatible with the European Convention.
In addition, if courts and the JCHR agree that a piece of legislation does
not comport with the requirements of the European Convention, they can
combine to induce the executive to change that legislation.  The combination 
of the JCHR’s publicity and the threat of imminent court disapproval is
often more persuasive than just one of these branches acting alone.  This
combination is even more effective for laws that have already been struck
down or ruled incompatible either by British courts or the European Court 
of Human Rights. If the JCHR correctly predicted a court ruling and the
executive suffered a judicially-imposed public embarrassment, the executive 
has been more likely to listen to the JCHR when it amends the incompatible 
legislation or legislates again on the same topic.191
 188. Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 115.  Moreover, at least 
in the beginning, the JCHR, by citing case law and statutes, was able to show its expertise
and therefore garnered more respect from Parliament and the executive.  Feldman, The Impact
of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, supra note 140, at 112. The JCHR has 
also justified this approach on the grounds that it avoids overlap with other parliamentary
committees.  NINETEENTHREPORT, THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN THE 2001–2005PARLIAMENT,
supra note 121, at 34. 
189. The executive has shown it wants JCHR involvement when drafting legislation 
following an adverse ruling from the European Court of Human Rights. Letter from Chris 
Grayling, Lord Chancellor, supra note 186. 
190. The Ministry of Justice has published a report designed to help officials in public
authorities understand their duties under the Human Rights Act.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION, Oct. 2006, DCA 45/06 (UK)
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/human-rights/human-rights-making-sense-human­
rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PAS-NE3C]. 
191. For example, as mentioned above, after the Mental Health Act 1983 was
declared incompatible by the Law Lords, the executive removed a draft bill and substituted
it with a remedial order as per the JCHR’s suggestions.  SIXTH REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH
ACT 1983 (REMEDIAL) ORDER 2001, supra note 169.  However, the executive may still choose 
to ignore the JCHR and take advantage of the delay in obtaining a final judicial ruling.  It
can take four to five years for a case to reach the Law Lords, and European Court of Human 
Rights rulings can take even longer. While a case winds its way through the courts, the statute
 63
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Further, the executive has shown that it wants JCHR involvement when 
drafting legislation following an adverse ruling from the European Court 
of Human Rights.192 For example, the JCHR repeatedly used negative British 
and European court judgments regarding anti-terrorism law to convince 
the executive to create more safeguards and fewer movement restrictions
for suspected terrorists.193  The JCHR’s efforts were particularly important 
in this area because the executive initially resisted any change, even in the 
face of negative court decisions.194  The road was bumpy, to say the least, 
but the JCHR consistently spoke out and eventually succeeded in many of
the areas it brought to the executive’s attention.195 
Consequently, the JCHR’s use of court-centric reports appears effective.
Moreover, the threat of judicial intervention is much stronger in the United 
States than in the United Kingdom because the Supreme Court can actually 
strike down legislation for being incompatible with the rights held in the
Constitution.  If a human rights committee can point to Supreme Court precedent
to argue that the Court will probably strike down the proposed law as 
unconstitutional, Congress would likely seriously consider amending it to
avoid that result. 
Alternatively, a human rights committee can also show how a proposed 
law would violate international human rights law or precedent set by the
International Court of Justice and, although those judgments are not binding
on the United States,196 the Supreme Court sometimes finds international
court decisions, including decisions from the European Court on Human Rights, 
persuasive.197  In addition, a human rights committee could also publicize
will remain in force.  The executive also has many tools that it can use (and has used) to 
delay the implementation of a court ruling with which it does not agree.  Hiebert, The Human 
Rights Act: Ambiguity About Parliamentary Sovereignty, supra note 184, at 2265. 
192.  Letter from Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling, supra note 186. 
193. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT: COUNTER-TERRORISM
POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (EIGHTH REPORT): COUNTER-TERRORISM BILL, 2007-8, HL 50, 
HC 199, ¶¶ 55–73 (UK); JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT: PREVENTION 
OF TERRORISM BILL: PRELIMINARY REPORT, 2004-5, HL 61, HC 389, ¶¶ 5–13 (UK); JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TENTH REPORT: PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL, 2004­
5, HL 68, HC 334, ¶¶ 13–14 (UK). 
194. Stephen Howard, No Freedom for Detainees; Government Defies Law Lords’
Ruling, DAILY POST (Liverpool), Dec. 17, 2004, at 4; Neil Mackay, Home Secretary Charles
Clarke is Already Embroiled in a Battle Between Law Lords and the Government. At Stake
is British Democracy, SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), Dec. 19, 2004, at 13. 
195. Sweeny, Indefinite Detention and Antiterrorism Laws, supra note 92, at 1236. 
196.  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008). 
197. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).  There has been resistance
to courts looking outside of the United States for sources of persuasive authority, particularly at
the state level. Aaron Fellsmith, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State
Legislatures, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/ 
issue/13/international-law-and-foreign-laws-us-state-legislatures [https://perma.cc/FMU4-MLTR].
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existing relevant international court cases to put informal political pressure 
on Congress to change the law.  Accordingly, a United States human rights
committee should focus on likely court judgment outcomes when legislation 
or government policies have human or civil rights implications. 
As the above analysis indicates, courts and Congress do not interact
perfectly.  The judiciary sometimes criticizes statutes’ incomplete legislative 
histories and has even struck statutes as a result.198  Human rights legislation
is too important to risk such a result, which makes the need for a human
rights committee even more pressing.  A human rights committee would
force Congress to fully develop the Congressional record with regard to 
human rights concerns for all legislation, which would give courts a rich 
source of legislative history when considering the purpose, intent, and 
constitutionality of those statutes. Moreover, although Congress has shown 
itself capable of responding to—and correcting—court decisions, it has 
been limited by the whims of its members and the executive and could,
therefore, use the help of a dedicated human rights committee.  As the work 
of the JCHR shows, a human rights committee can strengthen the dialogue 
between courts and the legislature because the committee can form a stable
link between them. 
D. Other Benefits: Creating A Human Rights Language and Focus 
In addition to influencing government branches individually, a human
rights committee could provide a nexus for members of multiple government 
branches, as well as the public, to meet to combine their efforts to improve 
human rights. 
1. Creating a Human Rights Culture Within the Government 
In addition to interacting with each government branch directly, a human 
rights committee could also foster a dialogue between different government 
branches to ensure that legislation upholds human rights.  In order to do 
so, a human rights committee must garner respect from all three government 
branches. Again, in this area, the JCHR provides a good model for a 
congressional human rights committee. With regard to human rights issues, 
the JCHR made itself the center of the dialogue between government 
198. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (“RFRA’s legislative
record lacks examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws . . . .”).
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branches because each branch uses the JCHR’s reports for guidance.199 
By doing so, the JCHR helped foster a culture of human rights within the 
British government where all government branches consider the human
rights implications of proposed and existing British law.  This awareness 
of human rights and desire to avoid their infringement—whether due to 
fear of JCHR criticism, parliamentary delays that JCHR members or its 
reports instigate, or court reprisals based on JCHR findings and reports or 
as predicted by the JCHR—may end up as JCHR’s most important impact
on the government. 
Because the JCHR is an advising committee, it must rely upon its
persuasiveness to achieve any of its goals.200  The JCHR’s influence comes 
in part from the thoroughness and persuasiveness of its reports and its diligence 
and persistence in questioning Ministers.  The JCHR meets at least once 
per week while Parliament is in session and prolifically publishes its reports.201 
In its reports, the JCHR pays particular attention to detail; it not only looks 
at the text of the statute but also the guidance, training, and controls that each 
bill provides for in order to ensure that those aspects of the bill contribute 
to a culture of human rights.202 
Due to its diligence, Parliament, the executive, the judiciary, and the legal
community hold the JCHR in high regard.203  The JCHR produces thorough 
reports and, when the situation demands it, can create them very quickly.
For example, while Parliament considered the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism
 199. Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 112. 
200. David Feldman has repeatedly noted that some executive Departments are very
cooperative, others seem unaware of their duties under the HRA’s Section 19, and some
essentially stonewall the JCHR because they believe that the JCHR should simply accept 
that the bill is compatible because the executive said so.  Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny, 
supra note 83, at 340; Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, 
supra note 140, at 106; Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 116.  The JCHR’s
continuing frustration with inadequate Explanatory Notes is manifest in its reports. LEGISLATIVE
SCRUTINY UPDATE, supra note 137. 
201. Twenty-six reports were published in its first full term, nineteen in the 2002–03
term, twenty-three in the 2003–04 term, nineteen in the 2004–05 term, thirty-two in the 2005–
06 term, twenty-one in the 2006–07 term, thirty-two in the 2007–08 term, twenty-eight in 
the 2008–09 term, sixteen in the 2009–10 term, twenty-four in the 2010–12 term, nine in 
the 2012–13 term, and fourteen in the 2013–14 term.  Publications from Previous Parliaments–
Joint Committee on Human Rights, PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/business/
committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/publications/previous­
sessions [https://perma.cc/JXS2-PL5G] (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
202. Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics, supra note 89, at 112. 
203. Klug & Wildbore, supra note 95, at 242.  Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights serves as a model for other Commonwealth countries. See ANJALI SAKARIA & STEPHANIE
AIYAGARI, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE AS
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Bill, the JCHR produced reports at each of the bill’s stages even though
the bill went through Parliament quickly and received royal assent approximately
eighteen days after the executive introduced it into the House of Commons.204 
In doing so, according to Lord Plant, the JCHR “provided an authority for 
dissent.”205 
Perhaps the most important reason for the JCHR’s influence is that it 
monitors and attempts to increase its own efficacy.206  For example, the
JCHR, in its quest to be more useful to Parliament, began publishing more 
thematic reports because Parliament and the executive deemed them more 
influential.207  Further, the JCHR has produced three substantial reports
that analyzed its own influence and detailed how it can and will improve 
itself.208  Finally, the JCHR also created working methods to “ensure that
its legitimacy and influence are likely to be maximized both inside Parliament 
and the wider human rights community.”209 
The JCHR also does not limit itself to the rights contained in the HRA
and works to ensure that the United Kingdom also fully complies with its 
other international rights obligations, again making the JCHR the focal 
point for human rights discussions in the United Kingdom.210  In fact, even
after the Equality and Human Rights Commission was created in 2007, the
JCHR arguably still needed to investigate abuses and promote a culture of
rights, particularly in the face of criticisms that the new commission did 
204. TENTH REPORT: PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL, supra note 193; NINTH REPORT:
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL: PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 191; ALEXANDER HORNE 
& GAVIN BERMAN, CONTROL ORDERS AND THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005, at 1 
(2011).
205.  Interview with Raymond Plant, supra note 87. 
206. NINETEENTHREPORT, THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN THE2001–2005PARLIAMENT, 
supra note 121, at 38.  Lord Lester refers to the JCHR as a “watchdog and a bloodhound.” 
Lester, supra note 126, at 2.
 207. SIXTH REPORT: THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN 2007 AND THE STATE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UK, supra note 148, at 73; THE COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, 
supra note 16, at apps. 1, 11.8(i). 
208. NINETEENTH REPORT: THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN THE 2001–2005
PARLIAMENT, supra note 121 (discussing the JCHR’s history and working relationships
with the three government branches); THE COMMITTEE’S FUTURE WORKING PRACTICES, 
supra note 16 (discussing a strategy for improving the JCHR’s efficacy); SIXTH REPORT, 
THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN 2007 AND THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK, supra
note 148 (identifying recurring problems with legislative scrutiny of bills).
209. Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, supra note 
140, at 113. 
210. Ewing, supra note 64, at 97–98; Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act,
supra note 62, at 18; Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas, supra note 127, at 1978. 
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not do enough to promote human rights or the HRA.211 Indeed, the JCHR 
itself voiced some of these criticisms.212 
Finally, the JCHR created a culture of rights in the United Kingdom due
to the respect its members command.  JCHR members are highly regarded
and the JCHR is jointly controlled so that its opinions are less likely to
be—or at least less likely to appear to be—politically motivated.213  The
JCHR consistently attempts to reach a consensus view, which adds to the 
JCHR reports’ value.214  Moreover, JCHR members are often human rights
activists themselves, which lends further authority to the JCHR’s conclusions
and recommendations.  These members take a keen interest in the JCHR’s
activities, contribute substantially to their meetings, and actively attempt
to further the JCHR’s interests within Parliament.  Knowledgeable members 
can also more effectively raise and answer on the JCHR’s reasoning and 
human rights in general during debates. 
In addition, the JCHR’s persistence in its communications with the
executive and its impressive output of reports would not be possible without 
its leaders’ personal commitments.  Although the Chair of the JCHR has
repeatedly changed over the past few years, all of the JCHR’s Chairs have
shown themselves committed to advancing human rights, no matter what 
their political affiliations.  Moreover, the JCHR’s current legal advisor,
Murray Hunt, is also very proactive.215  Hunt describes himself as a legal 
activist who does not “believe that legal advisors are just sort of passive
people who answer tricky legal questions when they come up.”216  He offers
suggestions on what the JCHR should do, how it should go about its work 
and what it should look at. Hunt is particularly concerned with the JCHR’s
effectiveness with regard to parliamentary debates and executive policy 
changes.217  This strong belief in the HRA and the JCHR by both its Chair
and legal advisor that makes the JCHR more powerful. 
As the JCHR shows, the government needs to create a respected, bipartisan 
human rights committee to ensure the committee’s efficacy.  In contrast,
as noted above, both the Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil Rights 
Division have been criticized for being ineffective due to politicization. 
211.  Interview with John Wadham, July 30, 2014. 
212. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRTEENTH REPORT: EQUALITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, 2009-10, HL 72, HC 183, ¶¶ 26, 83 (UK); JOINT COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE: THE WORK OF THE EQUALITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, 2013–14, HC 1294, at 31, 32 (UK). 
213. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act, supra note 62, at 16–17. 
214. According to the JCHR’s legal advisor, there is never much disagreement among 
members as to a report.  Interview with Murray Hunt, supra note 122. 
215.  Interview with Anthony Lester, supra note 118. 
216.  Interview with Murray Hunt, supra note 122. 
217. Id. 
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Moreover, the history of the Commission on Civil Rights shows that the 
ideology of its members, particularly its chair, can definitively determine 
whether a human rights body succeeds in its mission.218  Indeed, some 
have argued that the Commission on Civil Rights initially succeeded because 
its first six commissioners agreed on complex issues even though they were
all from diverse geographic backgrounds and party affiliations, which added 
to the Commission on Civil Rights’ perceived impartiality.219  Similarly, 
it has been argued that both the Commission on Civil Rights and the Civil 
Rights Division should amend their appointment or hiring practices to
ensure that political concerns should not interfere.220 
A successful United States human rights committee would need careful 
staffing to ensure that it could create and maintain a nonpartisan image. 
In order to be in accord with the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 
a human rights committee—or any human rights institution—must appoint
its members using “a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees to 
ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society)
involved in the protection and promotion of human rights, particularly by
powers which will enable effective cooperation.”221  The Commission on 
Civil Rights’ current composition is too easily manipulated by politics to
satisfy these requirements.222  In fact, three United Nations bodies have
expressed concerns that the United States has no national, independent human
rights institution.223 
Additionally, a human rights committee needs a full commitment from 
its members and unanimity in its reports to ensure that its message remains
focused and protected from attacks painting the committee as political or 
218. Marcus, supra note 13, at 92. 
219. McAward, supra note 21, at 311; Robert B. McKay, Report of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights Washington, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 755 (1960). 
220. See Frye et al., supra note 22, at 481, 483 (noting that the Commission’s current
appointment procedures—four members appointed by the president, four by the House, and 
four by the Senate—has led to polarized and deadlocked Commissions that have a slim chance
of publishing unanimous reports.); Kennedy, supra note 14, at 228 (“The Division should
adopt permanent safeguards against political interference in personnel matters. It should 
routinely provide all applicants for career positions with a written statement of laws and 
personnel rules forbidding consideration of political affiliation in hiring, inform them how 
to report violations, and ask applicants to certify that they have not been asked about their 
political loyalties during the screening process.”).
221. Crooms & Sidhu, supra note 54, at 131 (quoting Paris Principles, G.A. Res. 48/134, 
at 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Mar. 4, 1994)).
222.  Crooms & Sidhu, supra note 54, at 131–32. 
223. Id. 
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partisan. Strong, respected leaders could also ensure that the work of a 
human rights committee would gain the respect of the government and the
public at large. Any government entity seeking to promote human rights 
would need to counteract the government and the public’s ignorance of, 
and even resistance to, the incorporation of human rights into public discourse.
As the JCHR has shown, strong leaders who take an active role in how a 
human rights committee operates can create a good reputation for the 
committee and, by extension, emphasize the importance of human rights 
to the government and the public.
Moreover, despite the partisan culture in Congress, the creation of a 
well-respected, bipartisan committee is possible in the United States.  In
fact, one already exists: the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  Congress 
created the CBO in 1974 as part of the Budget Act, which, 
reasserted the Congress’s constitutional control over the budget by establishing
new procedures for controlling impoundments and by instituting a formal process
through which the Congress could develop, coordinate, and enforce its own
budgetary priorities independently of the President.224 
The CBO’s main task is to “provide the budget committees and the Congress 
with objective, impartial information about budgetary and economic issues.”225 
To that end, the CBO reports on the likely economic effects of proposed 
legislation and produces annual reports of the economic impact of existing 
legislation.226 The CBO also reports on measures such as legislative
amendments and committee reports even when not required to do so.227 
The CBO prides itself on its transparency and states that its excellent 
reputation is based in part on its practices of providing clear reasoning for 
its conclusions.228  Members of Congress and their staff members often 
confer with the CBO to better understand its reports.229  The CBO also 
persuades with its perceived objectivity.  Even when criticized, the CBO’s 
impartiality is generally not called into question, only the evidentiary 
support of its conclusions.230  Further, in order to preserve its appearance 
224. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE 1 (Nov. 2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/2012­
IntroToCBO.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YW6-3GFA].
225. Id. 
226. Gregory Dolin, Speaking of Science: Introducing Notice and Comment into the 
Legislative Process, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 243, 266. 
227. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1143 (1997). 
228. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 224, at 9–10. 
229. Id. at 11. 
230. See Garrett, supra note 227, at 1149. But see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1031–32 (2011) (arguing that Congress pressured the CBO to 
determine that the PAYGO tax proposal would have no negative impact on the budget). 
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of impartiality, the CBO has strict rules about its appointment procedures 
and the ability of its staff to engage in political activities.231 
According to the CBO itself, the CBO “is widely acknowledged both
on and off Capitol Hill . . . [for] providing nonpartisan and thoughtful
analysis to the Congress.”232  However, the CBO also emphasizes that it 
does not make policy recommendations.233  Despite this self-imposed 
limitation, the CBO’s conclusions about the budget impact of proposed 
legislation often persuade members of Congress, who frequently use its 
reports during debates to argue for or against a proposal.234  According to 
one scholar, “Congress often ‘drafts in the shadow’ of these CBO budget
scores.”235  A 2011–12 survey of congressional staffers found that CBO
reports feature prominently in their minds when drafting legislation.236 
These congressional staffers also reported that they would repeatedly redraft 
and resubmit a piece of proposed legislation until the CBO no longer 
reported that the bill would have a negative budgetary score.237  Indeed, 
even though the CBO’s reports are not binding, if a politician wants to argue 
for a legislative proposal that the CBO indicated would have a negative
 231. Dolin, supra note 226, at 266–68 (“The CBO ensures that it remains a neutral 
arbiter (and is perceived as such) by limiting the political activities of its staff, requiring
that the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate appoint the Director
of the Office after consultations with the members of the committees having jurisdiction 
over the budgetary matters, giving the Director a fixed four-year term (irrespective of the 
political vicissitudes of the individuals originally responsible for the Director’s appointment),
and seeking input from a variety of outside experts.”) (footnotes omitted).
232. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 224, at 9. 
233. Id. at 1. 
234. Dolin, supra note 226, at 268; Markus Heintzen & Stephen Utz, Public Debt in
the United States and Germany: A Constitutional Perspective, 29 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 71, 
98 (2013) (“CBO scoring continues to be one of the more important discussion points in 
congressional bargaining.”).  The House of Representatives was recently criticized for refusing 
to wait for the CBO’s report on the American Health Care Act before voting to pass the
measure. Dan Mangan, House Obamacare replacement ‘can’t pass Senate without major 
changes,’ says GOP senator, CNBC (Mar. 9, 2017, 12:37 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2017/03/09/house-obamacare-replacement-cant-pass-senate-without-major-changes.html. 
235. Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 125 (2015). See also Bruce 
M. Owen, “To Promote the General Welfare”: Addressing Political Corruption in America, 5 
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 3, 32 (2016) (“Members of Congress generally accept the [CBO’s
score] as an authoritative bipartisan constraint on deficit spending.”).
236. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside-an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66
STAN. L. REV. 725, 731, 764 (2014). 
237. Id. at 764. 
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impact on the budget, he or she will most likely acknowledge the CBO’s 
report and argue for why Congress pass the law anyway.238 
The CBO presents an American model for the respect a human rights
committee could generate in the United States.  Although human rights 
may be considered controversial, in recent years the federal budget has 
also been the subject of contentious debates,239 which shows that a properly
staffed and dedicated human rights committee can command respect in
Congress, just as the JCHR has in the United Kingdom.  Moreover, by creating 
a culture that embraces the concept of human rights within the government, 
a human rights committee can more easily create a culture of human rights
within the general public. 
2. Promoting Public Awareness and Respect for Human Rights
In the United States, some of the public at large consider the concept of
human rights to be controversial.  For example, although the public
sympathetically views the plight of the citizens of Flint, the accusations of 
systemic racism and police brutality in Ferguson and other communities 
has been fraught with controversy and counter-protests.240 In order to ensure 
its success, a human rights committee will need to educate the public about 
human rights and the work of the committee. 
Indeed, a human rights committee could harness public opinion, either
directly or through the media, to ensure that the government meets its human 
rights goals. As shown in the United Kingdom, human rights issues can
generate substantial media attention, particularly when different rights conflict 
and create controversial issues. Due to sometimes partisan portrayals of 
human rights laws, a respected legislative committee can be a voice of reason 
in the public dialogue by either warning of imminent human rights infringements 
or debunking myths about human rights that the press or government
officials perpetuate. 
The JCHR shows how this can be done.  In the United Kingdom, although 
the public knew the phrase “human rights” prior to the enactment of the 
238. Dolin, supra note 226, at 267. 
239. Kelsey Snell, Congress Returns with One Goal: No Government Shutdown, 
WASH. POST (Sep. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/ 
09/06/congress-returns-with-one-goal-no-government-shutdown/?utm_term=.58d725169808. 
240. See, e.g., Jessica Chasmar, Black Lives Matter Leader Explains Why ‘All Lives Matter’
Is a Racial Slur, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2016/feb/25/marissa-johnson-black-lives-matter-leader-explains/; Kurtis Lee & Matt Pearce,
Thunderstorms, Counter-Protesters and Calm on Ferguson’s Streets, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
21, 2014, 12:10 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-rainy-protest-20140820­
story.html. Similarly, over time, the public’s views on racial inequality changed and the 
Commission’s work began to seem more controversial and less relevant, which has undermined
its persuasiveness.  Marcus, supra note 13, at 89. 
72
SWEENY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2018 11:18 AM     
 

























   
  
 
     
  
    
 
[VOL. 54:  21, 2017] To Protect Human Rights 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
HRA, the United Kingdom had never had a bill of rights that specifically
set out the rights of citizens.  The rights contained in the HRA, moreover, 
are those found in the European Convention, which many British people 
perceive as foreign to them.  Consequently, in order to gain public support, 
the JCHR had to overcome the British people’s resistance to a European
model of rights as well as make the public aware that they could sue the
British government in British courts.  To achieve these goals, the JCHR 
has always welcomed media coverage and public attention, published 
press reports, employed a press officer, and informally kept track of when
the media used its reports.241 
In return, the media was quick to use the JCHR’s reports in its coverage 
of human rights issues.  Almost since the JCHR’s inception, the newspaper 
broadsheets reported on most of the JCHR’s legislative scrutiny reports,
particularly for the more controversial subjects such as crime, terrorism,
immigration and mental health.242  This media coverage is generally factual
in nature with the journalists quoting JCHR’s statements as the opinions 
of an “influential” or “cross-party” parliamentary committee and as evidence 
of the controversial nature of the bills under consideration.243  In addition,
the JCHR’s oral and written questions, posed to relevant Ministers, assist
the media because the answers provided by key executive actors often 
produce sound-bites for the media to quote.244 
Further, although the right-wing press has generally been dismissive of
the HRA, it almost uniformly reports on the JCHR in a neutral or even positive 
241.  Klug & Wildbore, supra note 95, at 242. 
242. See, e.g., Robert Ford, Blunkett Plan on Asylum Education ‘Like Apartheid,’
TIMES (London), June 22, 2002; Chris Green, Grayling’s Young Offenders’ Bill Will Put 
Lives at Risk, Say Critics, INDEPENDENT, June 11, 2014; Matthew Hickley, Law to Seize
Profits of Crime ‘May Breach Human Rights,’ DAILY MAIL, Feb 12, 2002; Philip Johnston,
Bill ‘Could See Girls Detained for Immorality,’ DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2002; Scrap
Jail-Without-Trial Law, WESTERN MAIL, Aug. 5, 2004. 
243. See, e.g., Green, supra note 242; Inquests Without Juries ‘Alarming,’ DAILYTELEGRAPH, 
Feb. 8, 2008. 
244. See, e.g., Nigel Morris, Blasphemy Law to Be Consigned to History, INDEPENDENT,
Nov. 15, 2001, at 11, Factiva, Doc. No. ind0000020011115dxbf0005t (Home Office 
Minister’s statements to the JCHR); Nicholas Watt, No 10 Pleads with Labour to Save 
Gay Marriage Bill: Tory Rebellion on Amendment Will ‘Cost Pounds 4bn and Take Two 
Years,’ GUARDIAN, May 20, 2013, at 1, LEXIS (Minister explaining costs of legislative 
amendment that would grant civil partnerships to heterosexual couples); X-rays to Beat
Age Lies, EVENING STANDARD, Feb. 21, 2007, at 6, 2007 WLNR 3423499 (Minister explaining
how x-rays can weed out “bogus asylum seekers” pretending to be children).
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manner, which has allowed the JCHR to reach a wider audience.245  Like
right-wing publications, the tabloid press does not show the hostility to 
the JCHR that it shows to the HRA.246  Indeed, the fact that the tabloids
largely refrain from attacking the JCHR indicates that the JCHR already 
has some prestige, if not influence, in the real world. 
The JCHR’s coverage in both broadsheet and tabloid media gives it a 
line of communication directly to the public, which has undoubtedly
increased its influence within the executive.  Publicity of the executive’s
shortcomings, particularly with regards to the rights of its citizens, can and 
has been deeply embarrassing.247  The executive has also shown that it will 
respond to media queries regarding critical JCHR reports,248 which gives
the JCHR more publicity and highlights its existing influence within the 
executive. 
The JCHR cannot force Parliament to use its reports in its debates, the 
executive to amend policies, or the judiciary to use its findings when deciding
cases with human rights implications.  Instead, the JCHR exerts influence 
through political pressure within the government and more informal
pressure from the media and general public.  A United States human rights
committee would do well to build on this model and use the other government 
branches as well as public pressure and the media to advance its goals. 
245.  Vincent Moss, New Blow to School Reforms, SUNDAY MIRROR, Feb. 5 2006, at 
4, 2006 WLNR 2018856; Police ‘Did Not Respect Human Rights’ During G20 Protests, 
LONDON PAPER, July 28, 2009; Rosa Prince, Shame of OAP Care, MIRROR, Aug. 15, 2007, 
at 20, 2007 WLNR; “Secrecy” of Ministers in Torture Row, DAILY MAIL, Aug. 4, 2009, 
2009 WLNR 15042386; Tap Call in Terror Trials, SUN, Aug. 1, 2006, at 2, Factiva, Doc. 
No. THESUN0020060801e28100001.  The one exception is The News of the World which 
has criticized the JCHR as protecting pedophiles, illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers. 
Jamie Lyons & Euan McColm, Rights Threat to School Paedo Ban, NEWS WORLD, Aug, 
13, 2006, LEXIS; Jamie Lyons, ‘2,050 Free to Stay,’ NEWS WORLD, Nov. 12, 2006, LEXIS; 
Jamie Lyons, It’s Asylum Lunacy, NEWS WORLD, July 22, 2007, LEXIS. However, The News of
the World did present the JCHR’s investigation into the torture of Iraqis by British troops 
neutrally but briefly. Torture Mystery, NEWS WORLD, July 27, 2008, LEXIS. 
246. Some tabloids have even managed to criticise the HRA while presenting the JCHR
in a completely neutral manner as just doing its job.  A. Porter, Schools Bid Is ‘Hit by Rights,’
SUN, May 27, 2006, at 2, Factiva, Doc. No. THESUN0020060516e25g000y.
247. See, e.g., Niall Firth, British Security Services Have ‘Dubious Record on Human 
Rights’, Says Court Ruling Ministers Tried to Suppress, Daily Mail (Apr. 9, 2010, 15:13 
EDT), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1253958/MI5-dubious-human-rights-record­
Binyam-Mohamed-case-says-court.html.
248. See, e.g., Joe Churcher, MPs ‘Misled over Army Torture,’ INDEPENDENT, July 28,
2008, Factiva, Doc. No. IND0000020080728e47s0003k (“Mr Browne said: ‘The committee
has acknowledged that many of the concerns it has raised in its report may be investigated
by the inquiry.’”); Michael Clarke, Straw’s Curfews on Children ‘Breach Their Human
Rights,’ DAILY MAIL, Apr. 27, 2001, at 33, LEXIS (“The Home Office said it believed the 
Bill ‘as drafted’ was compatible with the Human Rights Act but it would consider the
recommendations.”). 
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Again, the CBO presents a good model for what a congressional 
committee can do to effectively interact with the public both directly and 
indirectly.  Although its reports are not formally subjected to public notice 
and comment,249 the CBO makes its official reports public on the internet 
immediately after it publishes them and members of the CBO often speak 
at professional conferences so they can directly interact with experts in
the field. 250  In addition, members of Congress also use CBO reports— 
and the CBO’s nonpartisan reputation—to argue for their positions to the 
press.251 
The press is particularly important in the United States where human
rights are generally not given much media attention.  Currently, the media 
quickly focuses on civil rights scandals such as Flint or Ferguson but gives
little coverage to the reports of the Commission or the Civil Rights Division.252 
Moreover, as discussed above, the typical American does not think about 
human rights at all; the public uses the phrase “civil rights” for issues that
the rest of the world calls “human rights.”  In addition to the limitations 
of the phrase “civil rights” discussed above, the American public’s failure 
to connect with human rights is problematic because, in addition to domestic
civil rights law, the United States has ongoing international human rights 
obligations that the media and public often ignores. 
Although seldom discussed, the United States ratified several human
rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Slavery Convention, the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the 
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
International Protected Persons.253  Several of these conventions contain 
249. Nou, supra note 235, at 125. 
250. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 224. 
251. Jeffrey Branstetter & Darleen Druyun, An Evolving Case Study in Corruption,
Power, and Procurement, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 443, 452–53 (2005) (detailing how John McCain 
used a CBO report to argue that the United States should buy instead of lease tankers from 
Boeing).
252. There is some evidence that the Commission in the United States has successfully
used the media to further its agenda, but those efforts have by no means been consistent.
Marcus, supra note 13, at 89. 
253. The United States has also signed but not ratified several other treaties such as 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.  For a complete list of international human rights treaties and the United States’ 
status with regard to those treaties, see Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties 
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reporting requirements, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).254 
These reporting requirements, though periodic, are quite robust and are 
currently handled by the State Department.255  The United States submitted 
its most recent report under the ICCPR to the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations in 2011and supplemented the report in 2015 in response 
to questions from the UN.256  Similarly, the United States submitted its most
recent CERD report in 2013, and it was reviewed and received a report in
response in 2014.257  The United Nations has shown continuing concerns
with the United States’ reports, particularly with regard to racial disparities 
and racial profiling.258 
These reports show that the international community perceives the United
States’ civil rights concerns as human rights issues.  The United States appears
to view them this way as well.  In its latest report to the United Nations 
ICCPR Committee, the United States specifically mentioned investigations
by the Department of Justice into police misconduct in Ferguson and 
Cleveland—and the Department of Justice’s findings of a pattern of
racially-motivated misconduct—as evidence that the United States is continuing 
its work to meet its obligations under the ICCPR.259 
– USA, UNIV. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ 
ratification-USA.html [https://perma.cc/7XYR-DR2U] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
254. See U.S. Treaty Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/reports/
treaties/index.htm [https://perma.cc/MRF5-GFRU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017) (“United 
Nations human rights treaties require that States Parties report periodically on their
implementation of their treaty obligations.”).
255. See id. (“These comprehensive reports involve substantial coordination with
relevant U.S. Government agencies.”).
256. Report Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), U.S.DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/c16069.htm [https://perma.cc/
XH36-NLSB] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
257. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Report, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/cerd_report/ [https://perma.cc/R67C-J2JC]
(last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
258. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations
on the Combined Seventh to Ninth Periodic Reps. of the U.S., at 2−4, U.N. Doc. CERD/
C/USA/CO/7-9 (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/files/ 
cerd_concluding_observations2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV3N-XCEC]; Hum. Rts. Comm., 
ICCPR: Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of the U.S., at 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/235641.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WPX7-X3QJ]. 
259. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ONE-YEAR FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
ON ITS FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, at 4–5, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
242228.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YSE-52ZW].
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Although these conventions are unlikely to directly impact domestic law, 
they can be used by a human rights committee to put political pressure on
Congress and the President, but only if the media and public opinion are 
used effectively.  Currently, the media seldom covers United States’ reports
under its international human rights obligations, even when they touch on 
major national scandals like police misconduct in Ferguson.260  Although 
the media has occasionally reported on the United Nations’ concerns with 
the Flint water crisis and racial profiling and police misconduct,261 it does
not report on what the United Nations’ concerns could mean for the United
States or the United States’ reports to the United Nations.  These gaps in media
coverage and the public’s corresponding ignorance of what role human rights
can play in addressing civil rights issues emphasizes the need for a human
rights committee that could tie these strands together and inform the public. 
For example, the JCHR uses the media as described above for its reports 
on the United Kingdom’s international human rights obligations.262  The
JCHR’s reports on the United Kingdom’s compliance with United Nations
treaties have led to parliamentary debates, official statements to the press,
and enhanced media coverage.263  A congressional human rights committee 
like the JCHR could likewise become a central location for all human rights
260. In contrast, Michael Brown’s family’s plea before the United Nations and Obama’s 
statements before the United Nations General Assembly that referred to Ferguson and other
civil rights issues, have been reported.  Mark Berman, A Day of Unrest in Ferguson Ends with 
Protesters and Police Facing Off, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2014, at 1, 2014 WLNR 36895912; 
Ferguson One Year Later: The People, Places and Ideas that Came to Prominence over
the Past Year, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 2015, at 2, 2015 WLNR 23534626. 
261. Todd Spangler, UN Experts Raise Human Rights Concerns in Flint, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (May 3, 2016, 6:17 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
flint-water-crisis/2016/05/03/united-nations-human-right-flint/83884390/ [https://perma.cc/
TK9U-2UKU]; Justin Worland, U.N. Panel Sharply Criticizes Police Brutality in U.S., 
TIME (Nov. 28, 2014), http://time.com/3609811/police-brutality-united-states-un-ferguson-
torture/ [https://perma.cc/BBF4-HTBE].
262. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTH REPORT: THE UK’S 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, 2014-15, HL 144, 
HC 1016 (UK) (United Kingdom’s compliance with the United Nations’ Convention on
the Rights of the Child).
263. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Austerity Has Hit Disadvantaged Children Hardest, 
MPs and Peers Say, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015, 8:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
society/2015/mar/24/austerity-has-hit-disadvantaged-children-hardest-mps-and-peers-say
[https://perma.cc/UZM4-4JD7] (JCHR’s report on UK’s compliance with United Nations’ 
Convention on the Rights of the Child); Henry Porter, No One’s Fooled – We Colluded in
Torture, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2009, 7:05 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2009/aug/02/hnery-porter-torture [https://perma.cc/MZ2N-9KSE] (JCHR’s Report on torture 
of suspected terrorists linked to United Nations Convention Against Torture). 
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concerns.  Such a committee could use the media to publicize what the United 
States is doing to improve human rights under domestic or international law
and what it still needs to improve.  At the very least, Congress would pay 
more attention to congressional committee reports on human rights during 
debates, which would provide more fodder for the media. 
V. CONCLUSION
The JCHR can provide valuable lessons to the United States if it endeavors
to create a human rights committee. Most importantly, the JCHR shows 
that such a committee can be successful in improving human rights legislation 
as well as identifying larger human rights issues that the government may
need to address. Even without the ability to implement its recommendations 
on its own, the JCHR provides an excellent example of what can be accomplished
through persuasion and working with each government branch to develop 
the country’s human rights laws.  The JCHR has improved human rights 
law within the United Kingdom by influencing legislative debates so that 
Parliament fully scrutinizes bills for human rights law compliance, convincing 
the executive to draft or amend bills so that they conform to the country’s
human rights obligations, providing a source of information for courts
deciding human rights issues, creating momentum in the legislature after
a negative court decision, and fostering a culture of rights within the
government and public.  Although not always successful, the JCHR has 
done much to enhance the human rights of British citizens and residents. 
The JCHR’s success in influencing British legislation and court decisions
in such a short period of time makes it a valuable point of comparison for
any American effort to create a congressional committee to investigate 
and advise the government regarding human rights laws in the United States. 
There are some systemic differences between the United Kingdom’s 
parliamentary system and the United States’ presidential system—most
notably, the United States’ strong separation of powers—which will likely
impact whether all of the JCHR’s practices would be effective in the United 
States. Future research should, therefore, focus on these institutional and 
cultural differences to ascertain which of the JCHR’s techniques would be
most effective in the United States. However, despite whatever differences
may exist, the United States would be wise to further study the JCHR to
ensure that, if the United States does create a human rights committee, it
can be as influential as possible. 
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